Delegation and Emission Tax in a Differentiated Oligopoly

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Author: 
Rupayan Pal
Description: 
WP-2009-007
JEL codes: 
Organisation: 
Abstract: 
This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare, under alternative modes of product market competition. It shows that, under pure profit maximization, the (positive) optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily decreasing in degree of product differentiation, irrespective of the mode of competition. The possibility of emission tax rate to be positive and lower for more differentiated products, under quantity (price) competition, is higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation. It also shows that, under quantity (price) competition, the equilibrium emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare are higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation.
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