

A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration: Axiomatic Approach with an Application to Population and Capital Cities

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Abstract

We construct an axiomatic index of spatial concentration around a center or capital point of interest, a concept with wide applicability from urban economics, economic geography and trade, to political economy and industrial organization. We propose basic axioms (decomposability and monotonicity) and refinement axioms (order preservation, convexity, and local monotonicity) for how the index should respond to changes in the underlying distribution. We obtain a unique class of functions satisfying all these properties, defined over any n -dimensional Euclidian space: the sum of a decreasing, isoelastic function of individual distances to the capital point of interest, with specific boundaries for the elasticity coefficient that depend on n . We apply our index to measure the concentration of population around capital cities across countries and US states, and also in US metropolitan areas. We show its advantages over alternative measures, and explore its correlations with many economic and political variables of interest.

Keywords: Spatial Concentration, Population Concentration, Capital Cities, Gravity, CRRA, Harmonic Functions, Axiomatics.

JEL Classification: C43, F10, R23.

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1 Introduction

Spatial concentration is a very important concept in the social sciences, and in economics in particular – both in the sense of geographical space, as studied by urban economics, economic geography or international trade, and in more abstract settings (e.g. product or policy spaces) that are studied in a number of different fields, from industrial organization to political economy. As a result, a number of methods have been developed to measure this concept, from relatively *ad hoc* measures such as the Herfindahl index to theoretically grounded approaches such as the “dartboard” method of Ellison and Glaeser (1997), and also including the adaptation of indices used to capture related concepts such as inequality (Gini coefficient, entropy measures). These measures are well-suited to analyzing the concentration of a given variable over a “uniform” space, in which no point is considered to be of particular importance in an *ex ante* sense.

In practice, however, it is often the case that some points are indeed more important than others. In other words, we might be interested in measuring the concentration of a given variable *around* a point (e.g. a city or a specific site), rather than its concentration *over* some area (e.g. a region or country). Examples of circumstances in which there is specific *ex ante* knowledge of the importance of a given point are not hard to come by. For instance, the study of urban sprawl puts a lot of emphasis on the concentration of population and economic activity around a geographical center (Glaeser and Kahn 2004). By the same token, it is often the case that capital cities can be naturally thought of as being particularly important points: Ades and Glaeser (1995, p. 198-199) observe that, for a number of reasons, “spatial proximity to power increases political influence”, and hence proximity to the capital city is related to political power.¹ Gravity equations in trade, as theoretically formalized by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), also involves the concept of multilateral resistance, expressible as a measure of how remote a particular country is from the ensemble of other countries. The geographical concentration of the world around each country, in this sense, is theoretically expected and empirically verified to affect trade flows in and out of that country.² In yet another context, it is often the case that the relevant concept of competition faced by a firm or producer depends on how concentrated around it are its competitors, and in economic geography the concept

¹In fact, the political importance of the capital city is vividly illustrated by the rich history of relocation decisions, often with an important political component (Campante and Do 2007).

²In an earlier version of this paper, available upon request, we detail the surprisingly close connection between our index and the formula of multilateral resistance.

of “market potential” (see Fujita et al. 1999) provides an analogous example essential in understanding the importance of a particular location on the whole distribution of individuals across space.

The concept of spatial concentration around a point is also important in non-geographical contexts. For instance, within a product space in which distances measure the likelihood that a country might move from one type of product to another (Hidalgo et al. 2007), one might be interested in how concentrated a country’s economy is around a specific industry, say, oil production. In yet another non-geographical context, within a policy space it can be the case that the status quo policy has special clout, as in Baron & Diermeier (2001), and the concentration of preferences around that status quo point may be of particular interest. Empirically, one could immediately connect to the voting records of politicians, or to the collection of opinions from, say, the World Value Surveys.

The standard indices of concentration are not suited to capture this type of situation, and more generally they leave aside plenty of information on actual spatial distributions. For instance, if we are measuring the concentration of the US auto industry around Detroit, it matters whether car plants are in nearby Ohio or in distant Georgia; however, a standard index of concentration computed at the state level would stay unchanged if all the plants in Ohio were moved to Georgia and vice-versa.

This paper presents an axiomatic method for generating a measure that is suited for such situations – what we call a *centered* index of spatial concentration. We choose an axiomatic approach because we want to build a common language that can codify the concept of spatial concentration around a point across a broad range of applications – ultimately, the concentration of any variable in any space of economic interest. This search for generality leads us to look for basic properties that are robust across different contexts, as opposed to model-specific.

Following this principle, we start by designating two basic properties that such an index ought to display. The first property is *Decomposability*, whereby the index can be decomposed into the measures obtained for any regions into which the space can be partitioned. This facilitates computation and interpretation, and will ensure that the index is founded at the individual level (in the sense that the index is the sum of the impact of every individual observation in the distribution it describes).³ The second property is *Monotonicity*, whereby

³Here we follow Echenique and Fryer’s (2007) approach to their axiomatically-based segregation index. As

the index should increase when individual observations are moved closer to the point of interest to which the index refers (henceforth the “capital point”, or simply the “capital”). We show that these two properties already define a class of measures consisting of the sum of any decreasing, integrable, real-valued function (which we call “impact function”) whose only argument is the distance between individual observations and the capital.

We further refine the class of admissible CISC (Centered Index of Spatial Concentration) by introducing three additional axioms. *Order Preservation* prescribes the very natural property of invariance of ranking between different distributions of individuals when the unit, or scale, of distance measure is arbitrarily changed – in other words, the ranking of two distributions should not change based on whether distances are measured in miles, kilometers, or millimeters. We show that this axiom implies that the impact function of an admissible CISC must be isoelastic (constant relative risk aversion). The final two axioms impose boundaries on the elasticity coefficient of the impact function. The axiom of *Convexity* in turn requires that the movement of individual observations have a greater marginal impact on the measure of concentration the closer the observations are to the capital – population movements in the outskirts of the capital city should matter more for the concentration of population around the capital than the same movements occurring in a distant corner of the country. Finally, *Local Monotonicity* specifies that the index must not decrease when a uniform group of individuals move closer to each other. We show that, in any n -dimensional Euclidian space, these two axioms imply that the elasticity coefficient, R_h , must lie between 0 and $n - 1$. The limit case when $R_h = n - 1$ corresponds to a particularly interesting index, dubbed Gravity-based CISC, that can be interpreted as eliciting the “gravitational pull” of the capital separately from possible local impacts of other points.

The literature has grappled with the question of devising a centered measure of spatial concentration. The simplest type of measure computes the share of observations that are within a certain distance of the capital point of interest – for instance, Ades and Glaeser (1995) use the share of a country’s population that lives in that country’s main city. These measures obviously discard a lot of information, by attaching zero weight to all observations falling outside of the designated boundary. Our measure, in contrast, incorporates that information while keeping the flexibility of allowing for different weights according to the application, as parameterized

we will discuss later, this does not preclude interaction between individual observations in determining the index.

by the elasticity coefficient.

Other approaches have emerged, for instance in the literature on urban sprawl, which has tried to measure the “centrality” of “mononuclear” urban areas – namely, the degree to which development in urban areas is concentrated around a central business district. Galster et al. (2001), for instance, measure this centrality by the inverse of the sum of the distances of each observation to the center. Another example is Busch and Reinhardt (1999), who measure the concentration of population around a geographical center by adding up a negative exponential function of distance. While certainly useful, the approaches in the literature have been *ad hoc*, and hence limited by what an intuitive grasp of the properties of a given space will provide. This intuitive grasp quickly reaches its limits when we move away from specific, concrete applications. Our axiomatic approach, in contrast, guarantees basic desirable properties for our index in any n -dimensional Euclidian space, which ensures wide applicability, to any situation that can be mapped onto such a space. It provides a solid framework to analyze the properties of any centered measure of spatial concentration, and compare them to our index. In particular, we can guarantee that any other measure will violate one or more of the desirable properties that we have spelled out. We can also show how our index relates naturally to the literature on the measurement of inequality, segregation (e.g. Echenique and Fryer 2007), polarization (Duclos et al. 2004), and even riskiness (Aumann and Serrano 2008).

The second part of the paper provides an example of empirical implementation of our measure, by computing an index of population concentration around capital cities across countries. Since we are working in a two-dimensional space, we consider the two polar cases of our class of admissible CISC – where the elasticity coefficients take the values of zero (linear), which we denote L-CISC, and one (logarithmic), which corresponds to the Gravity-based CISC, or G-CISC. We show that our index provides a more sensible ranking of countries than currently used *ad hoc* alternatives, and that it uncovers a negative correlation between the size of population and its concentration around the capital city that is not detected by those alternatives. Throughout our empirical implementation, we also show that the picture that would emerge from using a non-centered measure of concentration such as the location Gini coefficient as a proxy for the centered notion would in fact be very distorted.

In addition, motivated by the aforementioned idea that political influence diminishes with distance to the capital, we consider the correlation between population concentration and a

number of measures of quality of governance. We show that there is a positive correlation between concentration and the checks that are faced by governments, and that this correlation is present only in non-democratic countries.⁴ The statistical significance of this correlation is substantially improved by using our index instead of the *ad hoc* alternatives.

We also illustrate how our index can shed light on the issue of the choice of where to locate the capital city, which goes back at least to James Madison during the debates at the US Constitutional Convention of 1787. We show that there is a pattern in which both very autocratic and very democratic countries tend to have their capital cities in places with relatively low concentration of population. Inspired by the Madisonian origins of this debate, we extend our implementation by computing our index for US states, and finish it off by running the computations for US metropolitan areas.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the axioms, characterizes the unique class of indices satisfying them, and discusses other properties of the index, as well as how it compares to alternative measures of concentration and to the measurement of inequality, segregation, polarization, and riskiness. Section 3 contains the empirical implementation and correlation analysis, and Section 4 concludes.

2 The Centered Index of Spatial Concentration

2.1 Main definitions

We start by spelling out the definitions of the main mathematical objects and transformations that are required in constructing our index. Since our main concern is the spatial concentration of a variable – which can be thought of as population, economic activity, etc. – around a center, we start with the definition of centered distributions and subdistributions in Euclidian spaces. For mathematical convenience, we use smooth, positive, compact-support distributions in the space \mathbb{R}^n as an approximation of real world distributions (of population, economic activities, preferences over policy, etc.).

Definition 1 (Centered distribution and subdistribution) *A centered distribution is a couple of (i) a positive integrable distribution μ of compact support on \mathbb{R}^n , and (ii) one point*

⁴This is consistent with Campante and Do (2007), who present a theory of revolutions and redistribution where concentration is key in increasing the redistributive pressures faced by non-democratic governments.

\mathbf{C} in \mathbb{R}^n . \mathbf{C} is called the capital point of the distribution.⁵

A distribution μ is call normalized if $\int d\mu = 1$.

A distribution ν is a subdistribution of the distribution μ if ν is positive, the support of ν is a subset of the support of μ , and $\nu(A) \leq \mu(A)$ for every ν -measurable A . We denote $\nu \prec \mu$.

In words, a subdistribution of the distribution μ is a distribution dominated and majored by μ , or equivalently, $\nu \prec \mu$ if and only if ν is dominated by μ and both ν and $\mu - \nu$ are positive distributions.

This definition designates a special point of interest, the capital point (e.g. the capital city). Note also that it defines a *normalized* distribution of unit size. This is because, generally speaking, we want to be able to disentangle features of the distribution that are distinct from concentration *per se*, and most importantly among these features is the size of the population under consideration. We will see that it is always possible to normalize the distribution so that it is re-scaled to a unit size, and we can focus without loss of generality on such normalized distributions. This is what we will do in the remainder of the paper.

It is now straightforward to define the centered index of spatial concentration (henceforth referred to as CISC), which is the object we are ultimately interested in:

Definition 2 (Centered Index of Spatial Concentration) *A centered index of spatial concentration (CISC) \mathbf{I} is a real, continuous function defined on the set of centered distributions, denoted as $\mathbf{I}(\mu, \mathbf{C})$.*

Related to the concept of spatial concentration, we define the required transformations on distributions, namely squeeze (homothety) and rotation. A squeeze brings observations from parts of the distribution closer (when the scaling ratio is positive and less than one) to a center point by the same proportion. A rotation turns parts of the distribution around the center point by the same angle. These (along with reflection, unimportant for our purposes) are fundamental similarity transformations, which preserve the “shape” of objects.

Definition 3 (Squeezes, or homothetic transformations) *A squeeze of origin $\mathbf{O} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and ratio $\rho \in \mathbb{R}$, denoted $\mathcal{S}_{(\mathbf{O}, \rho)}$, brings any point \mathbf{X} closer to \mathbf{O} by a factor of ρ .*

⁵We use the term “capital point”, and not “center”, to emphasize that said point need not be located at any spatial concept of a center, such as a baricenter or the center of a circle.

Definition 4 (Rotations, or orthogonal transformations) ⁶ A rotation of origin $\mathbf{O} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and rotation matrix $M \in \mathbb{R}^{n,n}$, denoted $\mathcal{R}_{(\mathbf{O},M)}$, moves any point \mathbf{X} to a point \mathbf{X}' such that:

$$\mathbf{X}' - \mathbf{O} = M(\mathbf{X} - \mathbf{O}),$$

where M satisfies $MM^t = Id_n$ (M is orthogonal). It preserves the distance to the origin \mathbf{O} .

2.2 Basic Properties: Decomposability and Monotonicity

We start with two basic properties that we want our index to display: *decomposability* and *monotonicity* (with respect to the capital point of interest). Decomposability is a convenient property oftentimes sought in the literature of inequality indices (e.g. Bourguignon 1979). In our case, the idea is that, if the space under consideration is partitioned into any number of different regions, we are able to compute the index separately for each region, and from those indices obtain the overall measure for the entire population. More precisely, our first axiom establishes decomposability:

Axiom 1 (Decomposability) *The concentration measure of the sum of two distributions with disjoint supports is the sum of the concentration measures of each distribution.*

Formally:

$$\mathbf{I}(\mu + \nu, \mathbf{C}) = \mathbf{I}(\mu, \mathbf{C}) + \mathbf{I}(\nu, \mathbf{C}) \forall \mu, \nu, \text{Support}(\mu) \cap \text{Support}(\nu) = \emptyset. \quad (1)$$

This axiom means that the measure of concentration of a distribution can be (additively) decomposed into the measures of concentration of its subdistributions defined over non-overlapping regions of the original space. Figure 1 depicts this for the two-dimensional case in which the space is subdivided into three regions: The concentration index around point \mathbf{C} is the sum of the concentration measures of regions 1, 2, and 3 around that point. For instance, the concentration of the US population around Washington, DC can be decomposed into the concentration of the population of each state around that capital point.⁷

⁶More precisely, we define orthogonal transformations, of which rotations are a subset in two- and three-dimensional spaces. Our use of the term “rotations” is meant to convey the intuition of what the transformation achieves, but it does not apply, rigorously speaking, when the dimension is higher than three.

⁷An alternative, stronger formulation for the decomposability axiom would impose that the concentration measure of the sum of two distributions is the sum of the concentration measures for each distribution *for any two distributions*, and not only for those with non-overlapping domains. It would mean that when a population




Figure 1: Decomposability

Monotonicity is a very basic property that ought to be satisfied by any reasonable index of concentration: the index should increase when population is moved closer to the capital point. We now introduce the two fundamental axioms that will jointly deliver this property – Axioms 2 (squeeze monotonicity) and 3 (direction invariance, or isotropy):

Axiom 2 (Squeeze Monotonicity) *Squeezing a distribution closer to the capital point increases its measure of concentration.*

Formally:

$$I(\mu, C) < I(\mathcal{S}_{(C,\rho)}(\mu), C) \quad \forall \mu, \rho < 1.$$

Axiom 3 (Direction Invariance) *Rotating a distribution around the capital point does not change its measure of concentration.*

can be split into groups A, B, and C – say, along ethnic lines, income, or any other arbitrary criterion – we can compute the index separately for each group, and from those three indices be able to obtain the overall index for the entire population. (For instance, the concentration of the US auto industry around Detroit can be decomposed into the concentration of American auto makers and that of their foreign counterparts; the concentration of the population of Belgium around Brussels can be decomposed into the concentration of the Flemish and that of the Walloons; and so on.) This approach would lead us to the same class of indices, but it rules out from the start the possibility of interaction between individual observations. The weaker version of the axiom, in contrast, allows for local interactions between individuals, as individuals living in the same location may experience economies or diseconomies of scale in terms of their influence towards the capital. In other words, we need not impose from the start that the impact of each individual observation is independent from that of its neighbors.

Formally:

$$\mathbf{I}(\mu, \mathbf{C}) = \mathbf{I}(\mathcal{R}_{(\mathbf{O}, \theta)}(\mu), \mathbf{C}) \forall \mu.$$

To illustrate the implications of these axioms, let us consider the population of a country and how it is distributed over the country's territory. Axiom 2 implies that, if the entire population moves closer to the capital by a given proportion, say one half, then concentration must increase. However, it applies only to moves along the respective rays going through the capital and the original locations. (This is depicted, in two dimensions, in Figure 2.) Axiom 3, on the other hand, means that if the entire population of a country moves 20 miles to the right, while keeping everyone's initial distance to the capital unchanged, then concentration must remain constant. In other words, the direction from the capital city to each location is irrelevant to concentration. (This is depicted in Figure 3.)⁸ Taken together, these two axioms mean that a movement that brings the population closer to the capital point, along any direction, must increase concentration, while it must decrease concentration if the population is moved farther away from the capital city. In other words, they deliver monotonicity with respect to the capital.

Note that here the convenience of the decomposability property delivered by Axiom 1 comes to the forefront: it means that Axioms 2 and 3 can be understood in terms of the movements of individuals in the population, which can enhance the intuition behind them. Axiom 2 means that, if we take a specific individual in the population who lives, say, 200 miles away from the capital city, then if she moves to live some 10 miles towards the capital city, concentration should increase. Axiom 3 in turn guarantees that, if that individual moves to another place of equal distance (200 miles) to the capital city, then concentration should not change, or in other words, the direction from the capital city to each individual's location is irrelevant to concentration. The two axioms together mean that if an individual moves closer to the capital, along any direction, then concentration must increase.

These three basic axioms already have a powerful implication, as shown in Proposition 1. To understand this proposition, let us first introduce some notation for the impact of an

⁸In certain realistic cases, one could argue that not all directions are equal – say, because of the presence of a road that makes it easier to move in some direction, or of a mountain that makes it harder to move in another. However, this concern does not invalidate our framework, as one could rescale the dimensions accordingly. Further discussion on such conditions will follow later in the text, but this highlights the advantages of working with general and abstract Euclidian spaces.




Figure 2: Squeeze Monotonicity




Figure 3: Rotation Invariance

individual at location x on the capital \mathbf{C} , by defining the *impact function* h of the locations x , \mathbf{C} . Proposition 1 then states that the CISC must be the (integral) sum of the impacts of each individual observation, and that the impact of each individual must be expressed as a function of solely the distance to the capital point of interest, i.e. $h(|x - \mathbf{C}|)$. In addition, it must be the case that $h(d)$ is decreasing in d . More formally:

Proposition 1 *Axioms 1, 2 and 3 define the following class of population concentration indices:*

$$\mathbf{I}(\mu, \mathbf{C}) = \int h(|x - \mathbf{C}|)d\mu, \quad (2)$$

with $h(d)$ being a decreasing function on \mathbb{R}^+ so that the right hand side's integrand is integrable on \mathbb{R}^n .

Proof of Proposition 1. See Appendix. ■

This proposition establishes two separate properties. The first is *additivity*: the CISC is the sum of the impacts of individual observations. The proof of the proposition shows that this is directly related to Axiom 1. The second property, that the impact function is a (decreasing) function of distance only, is clearly related to the property of monotonicity that is delivered by Axioms 2 and 3.⁹ Finally, Proposition 1 also makes clear that normalization, or multiplication of the population distribution μ of a factor k will change the CISC by exactly the same factor. This enables us to disentangle concentration from population size; in other words, it justifies our focus on normalized distributions, i.e. μ such that $\int \mu = 1$, without loss of generality.

2.3 Refinement: Order Preservation, Convexity and Local Monotonicity

Proposition 1 shows that the first three axioms impose non-trivial restrictions on the class of admissible indices. However, it still leaves us with a fairly large class. After all, any decreasing function of the distance between individual points and the center \mathbf{C} would be an admissible impact function $h(d)$: a few obvious suggestions of standard functional forms include a step function, and logarithmic, exponential or polynomial (including linear) functions, among others.

⁹The three axioms interact closely in implying that the impact function, which from Axiom 1 alone could be defined in general as a function of the locations x , \mathbf{C} , and also the local population density $\mu(x)$, can be defined simply as a function $h(x, \mathbf{C})$.

In this section we will introduce three natural properties that would drastically restrict this class of indices into a very manipulable set of measures.

2.3.1 Order Preservation: Isoelasticity

Let us start by considering a property that has to do with what happens when we change the units in which distances are measured. Suppose we have two distributions, (μ, \mathbf{C}) , and (ν, \mathbf{C}) , and the distances between points are measured in miles. If μ is deemed to be more concentrated around \mathbf{C} than ν , it stands to reason that this relative ranking should not change if distances were instead measured in kilometers. In other words, changing the unit of distance measure should not change the ordering of distributions by the CISC. This change in units is isomorphic to a squeeze of the distribution around the capital point of interest by a factor of ρ , where $\rho > 0$ gives us the conversion rate between the different units. (Obviously, a “squeeze” in which $\rho > 1$ is actually an expansion around the capital point.) As a result, our property affirms that the relative order of different distributions remains unchanged when they are squeezed or expanded around the capital.

Axiom 4 (Order Preservation) *The ordering of two distributions of equal population by their CISC is not changed after re-scaling measures of distance.*

Formally: Given two distributions μ and ν of the same total mass ($\int d\mu = \int d\nu$), if $\mathbf{I}(\mu, \mathbf{C}) \geq \mathbf{I}(\nu, \mathbf{C})$, then $\mathbf{I}(\mathcal{S}_{(\mathbf{C}, \rho)}(\mu), \mathbf{C}) \geq \mathbf{I}(\mathcal{S}_{(\mathbf{C}, \rho)}(\nu), \mathbf{C}), \forall \rho > 0$.

As it turns out, adding this very natural axiom to the previous three has powerful implications in terms of pinning down a class of admissible CISCs. More precisely, Axiom 4 defines a specific subclass of impact functions within the class defined by Proposition 1 – it is that of isoelastic impact functions, as stated in the following Proposition:

Proposition 2 (Isoelasticity) *Axiom 4 and Proposition 1 imply that the impact function must be isoelastic (constant relative risk aversion), i.e. that it is $h(d) \equiv \alpha d^\gamma + \beta$ or $h(d) \equiv \alpha \log(d) + \beta$.*

Proof of Proposition 2. See Appendix. ■

In other words, if we define $R_h(d) \stackrel{def}{=} -\frac{h''(d)d}{h'(d)}$, the elasticity of the marginal impact function with respect to distance¹⁰ – or alternatively, the “coefficient of relative risk aversion” of the

¹⁰Technically, Proposition 2 also affirms the infinite differentiability of the impact function h , so the expression of $R_h(d)$ is meaningful.

impact function – then Proposition 2 establishes that our class of admissible CISCs must have $R_h(d) = R_h$, a constant. (Obviously, we have $R_h = 1 - \gamma$, and the log function is the limit case when $\gamma \rightarrow 0$.)

2.3.2 Convexity and Local Monotonicity: Boundary Restrictions

The class of admissible indices is further restricted by considering two additional properties that a CISC should display. The first property takes a movement akin to the one considered in Axiom 2, bringing an individual observation closer to the capital along the ray going through her initial location, and asks what happens when we vary the initial point of this movement. In other words, if we move an individual 10 miles closer to the capital, does it matter whether she started 20 or 200 miles away? Or, to take a concrete example, if we want to measure the concentration of Russia’s population around Moscow, should a given movement of individuals matter more or less whether it happens in the outskirts of Moscow or in Vladivostok in the far east corner of the country? It seems natural to assume that the former case should matter more than the latter. We thus posit that the marginal movement is (at least weakly) more important when the individual is close to the capital than when she is far away – that is to say, as an individual moves towards the center, not only her level of impact, but also her marginal impact on concentration is not decreasing. This requirement can be written as follows:

Axiom 5 (Convexity) *The marginal change in the impact of an individual is not increasing in his distance to the center.*

Formally:

$$h''(d) \geq 0.$$

We also impose restrictions on how the index behaves with respect to any other point in the space, besides the capital. Our next property has to do with changes of the index in response to squeezes of the distribution around any arbitrary point in the space, not restricted to the capital. Consider individual observations that are uniformly distributed around a given point T . Similar to Axiom 2, we posit that our index of concentration should not decrease when those individual observations are squeezed together around a given point T , as depicted in Figure 4. The intuitive idea is that, if individuals move closer to each other, we would expect that




Figure 4: Local Monotonicity

concentration will not go down as a result. Formally, this can be captured as follows.¹¹

Axiom 6 (Local Monotonicity) *For any point \mathbf{T} , the centered index of spatial concentration does not decrease when a uniform subdistribution over a circumference centered on \mathbf{T} is squeezed around that point.*

Formally:

$$\mathbf{I}(\eta, \mathbf{C}) \leq \mathbf{I}(\mathcal{S}_{(\mathbf{T}, \rho)}(\eta), \mathbf{C}) \forall \rho < 1, \forall \eta \text{ evenly-distributed circle distribution of center } \mathbf{T}.^{12}$$

It turns out that adding these two axioms to our previous set of basic axioms has quite powerful implications in terms of further restricting the class of admissible CISCs. These implications are immediately apparent in the simple case of the real line \mathbb{R} . Axiom 6 would then amount to saying that when two individuals at distances $d_1 < d_2$ on the same side of the center \mathbf{C} come closer to each other, our index of concentration should not decrease, or

¹¹There are two noteworthy points in this axiom. First, one could not relax the requirement of the uniform subdistribution: the counterexample is that a squeeze of a singleton towards point \mathbf{T} but away from the capital \mathbf{C} would violate the previous Axiom 2. Second, in the case where the circle (the support of the subdistribution η) that is squeezed around \mathbf{T} also contain \mathbf{C} in its interior, Axioms 2 and 3 automatically lead to Axiom 6 because all individuals on the circle are moving closer to \mathbf{C} , so the last axiom adds nothing to the specification. The new axiom only imposes further restrictions on the class of admissible impact functions in the case where that circle does not contain \mathbf{C} .

¹²In the general case of \mathbb{R}^n , the “circle” actually means a sphere of center \mathbf{T} .

equivalently, that $0 \geq h'(d_1) \geq h'(d_2)$. Yet Axiom 5 implies that $h'(d_1) \leq h'(d_2) \leq 0$. Thus $h'(d)$ is constant, i.e. the impact function h must be linear: $h(d) = \alpha d + \beta, \alpha < 0$. We have thus pinned down a unique class of admissible CISC, with a linear impact function, for the special case of the real line.

Our axiomatic approach enables us to be much more general. Quite remarkably, we can show (using harmonic function theory) that the basic intuition of the one-dimensional case extends to any n -dimensional Euclidian space, as our Axioms 5 and 6 define a specific subclass of impact functions within the class defined by Proposition 1:

Proposition 3 (Boundary Restrictions) *Within the class of centered indices of spatial concentration on \mathbb{R}^n defined in Proposition 1, Axioms 5 and 6 determine the following subclass of indices:*

$$\mathbf{I}(\mu, \mathbf{C}) = \int h(|x - \mathbf{C}|)d\mu, \quad (3)$$

with $h(d)$ being a decreasing function of distance and $0 \leq R_h(d) \leq n-1$, where $R_h(d) \stackrel{def}{=} -\frac{h''(d)d}{h'(d)}$.

Furthermore, when $R_h(d) = n - 1$, the inequality in Axiom 6 becomes an equality.

Proof of Proposition 3. We sketch the two steps of the proof, leaving the mathematically rigorous proof to the appendix. First, we show that Axiom 6 is equivalent to a special condition: the impact function needs to satisfy the Laplace inequality, namely that the sum of all second-order partial derivatives must be non-positive:

$$\Delta f \stackrel{def}{=} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_1^2} + \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_2^2} + \dots + \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_n^2} \leq 0. \quad (4)$$

Second, we show that the solution of (4), combined with Axiom 5, are equivalent to the results of Proposition 3. ■

Proposition 3 then specifies that Axioms 5-6 set the boundaries for the impact function based on its elasticity coefficient. These boundaries are especially tight when the dimensionality of the space under consideration is relatively low, i.e. when $n - 1$ is small. In particular, on the line \mathbb{R} , since $n - 1 = 0$, Axioms 5-6 allow only for linear impact functions, as we had argued above. On the plane \mathbb{R}^2 the boundaries are linear (where $R_h = 0$) and logarithmic functions (where $R_h = 1$).

2.4 Characterization of the Class of Admissible CISCs

We are now ready to characterize our class of admissible CISCs. Proposition 1 establishes that an index that satisfies decomposability and monotonicity has to be represented by the sum of the impacts of individual observations, which are in turn captured by an impact function that is a (decreasing) function of the distance to the capital point of interest only. Propositions 2 and 3 then establish that the key element of that impact function is $R_h(d)$, which describes the elasticity of the marginal impact of individual observations with respect to their distance from the capital point. An index that satisfies order preservation must have a constant elasticity (Proposition 2), and an index that satisfies convexity and local monotonicity must have that elasticity bounded between zero and an upper limit dependent on the dimensionality of the space under consideration (Proposition 3). When we combine the three propositions, we immediately obtain the following Characterization Theorem:

Characterization Theorem (Class of Centered Index of Spatial Concentration) *Axioms*

1 to 6 define the class of Centered Index of Spatial Concentration as:

$$\mathbf{I}(\mu, \mathbf{C}) = \int h(|x - \mathbf{C}|)d\mu,$$

$h(d)$ being a decreasing function of distance with a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion $R_h(d) \stackrel{def}{=} -\frac{h''(d)d}{h'(d)} \equiv R_h$ such that $0 \leq R_h \leq n - 1$. In other words, $h(d) = \alpha d^\gamma + \beta$ for $\gamma \in [2 - n, 1]$ or $h(d) = \alpha \log(d) + \beta$ (in case $n \geq 2$).

Particularly, in the plane \mathbb{R}^2 the admissible CISCs are of the form $\mathbf{I}(\mu, \mathbf{C}) = \int (\alpha|x - \mathbf{C}|^\gamma + \beta)d\mu(x)$, $\gamma \in [0, 1]$, $\alpha < 0$ or $\mathbf{I}(\mu, \mathbf{C}) = \int (\alpha \log(|x - \mathbf{C}|) + \beta)d\mu(x)$, $\alpha < 0$. The *log* impact function is the limit case when the coefficient $R_h = 1$. It exhibits additional properties considered in the next subsection.

2.4.1 Choice of R_h and a special case: the Gravity-based CISC

The practical implementation of the CISC requires a choice of R_h , the (constant) coefficient of relative risk aversion of the impact function h . The natural focal points are the extremes of the admissible range of coefficients, $R_h = 0$ and $R_h = n - 1$, on which we will concentrate our empirical implementation. The latter corresponds to the case of equality in Axiom 6.¹³ In

¹³We are focusing on the case in which the squeezed circle does not contain the center \mathbf{C} in its interior.

other words, any local force of concentration at an arbitrary point \mathbf{T} that moves people situated evenly on a circle around \mathbf{T} towards it does not affect the global measure of concentration around \mathbf{C} . The index thus measures the “gravitational pull” exerted by the capital point, while disentangling from the data any impact of the presence of other local forces. It is invariant to changes in the degree of attraction, or “gravity”, of any other points. An analogy comes from the gravitational pull of the Sun over the Earth, which is measured focusing only on the distance between the two bodies and their characteristics (mass), leaving aside the influence of all other planets.¹⁴ We define this “Gravity-based CISC” (G-CISC) as follows.

Property 1 (Gravity) *For any point \mathbf{T} , the CISC does not change when a uniform subdistribution over a circumference centered on \mathbf{T} is squeezed around that point.*

Proposition 4 (The Gravity-based CISC) *Axioms 1-3 and Property 1 pin down the Gravity-based CISC, or G-CISC, with the following impact function:*

$$h(d) = \begin{cases} \alpha d + \beta \quad \forall d > 0, \alpha < 0 & \text{if } n = 1 \\ \alpha \log d + \beta \quad \forall d > 0, \alpha < 0 & \text{if } n = 2 \\ \alpha d^{2-n} + \beta \quad \forall d > 0, \alpha > 0 & \text{if } n \geq 3 \end{cases} .$$

Proof of Proposition 4. Immediately follows from the Characterization Theorem. ■

Robustness to Measurement Errors The G-CISC brings an additional property that is very convenient in applications. In practice, the information used to compute the index typically comes in a grid format, where we only know the aggregate information of each cell. This introduces a source of measurement error. The G-CISC is orthogonal to such measurement error, thanks to the Property of Gravity. Indeed, if the population is symmetrically distributed within each cell, the Property of Gravity implies that we could replace that population with one mass point at the center.

¹⁴The analogy with gravity is actually deeper than what might seem at first sight: there is a connection between the G-CISC and the concept of *potential* in physics, which refers to the potential energy stored within a physical system – e.g. gravitational potential is the stored energy that results in forces that could move objects in space. In fact, our G-CISC can be interpreted, roughly speaking, as a measure of the potential associated with the capital point of interest. This is because the G-CISC is the index that satisfies the Laplace equation, which is stated as an inequality in the proof of Proposition 3, and potential is defined by a solution to that equation – those readers familiar with the physics of the concept will have noticed the connection from the use of harmonic function theory. To see this connection more clearly, note that in the “real life” three-dimensional space of Newtonian mechanics, the potential of a point with respect to a mass is the sum of inverse distances from that point to each location in the mass – and since the gravity force is the derivative of potential, it is proportional to the inverse of the squared distance, as one may recall from the classical Newtonian representation. Our G-CISC in three-dimensional space is also the weighted sum of the inverse of distance, and thus coincides with the concept of potential in physics.

2.5 Normalization

A crucial feature of the CISC defined in the Characterization Theorem is its flexibility: as long as it is applied to a distribution μ that is defined over a Euclidian space of any dimension, its desirable properties are ensured. This flexibility means that in any application it will be possible to shape the index in order to make it most suitable to the specific goals of the analysis. This can be done both by conveniently redefining the distribution under analysis, as we had indicated by focusing on normalized, unit-size distributions in our theoretical discussion, and by making use of the degrees of freedom afforded by the Characterization Theorem with regard to the choice of parameters α and β .

In order to see this more clearly, and motivated by our empirical implementation, let us fix ideas by focusing on a situation where our index is applied to the concentration of the population of a given geographic unit of analysis (e.g. a country) around a point of interest (e.g. the capital city), in two dimensions. Furthermore, we start by focusing our interest on the special case of the G-CISC – which means that the impact function is given by $h(d) = \alpha \log(d) + \beta$. (It is straightforward to extend the following analysis to other contexts.) In this context, we can think of any given country as a centered distribution (μ, \mathbf{C}) . The first thing to note is that there is often other information, in addition to population size, that we may want to disentangle from population concentration *per se*, e.g. the geographical size of the country. In addition, we would like to have an easily interpretable scale. A convenient way would be to restrict the index to the $[0, 1]$ interval, with 0 and 1 representing situations of minimum and maximum concentration, respectively. The latter can be defined simply as a situation in which the entire population is located in the center of interest; the former is a case in which it is located as far from the center as possible, where “as far as possible” is suitably defined.

For these purposes, we want a *normalized* G-CISC. Indeed, we can proceed with this normalization in two steps: (1) further normalize the distribution μ , transforming it into a distribution μ' that contains only the information we are interested in; and (2) set the parameters α and β . The specifics of each of these steps will depend on how the scale is defined, and in what follows we discuss a few benchmark examples:

Maximum distance across units of analysis A first approach is to set the minimum concentration based on the maximum possible distance between a point and the capital city in

any of the countries for which the index is to be computed. In this case, the index is evaluated at zero if the entire population lives as far away from the center as it is possible to live in any country.¹⁵ (As a result, only one country, the one where this maximum distance is registered, could conceivably display an index equal to zero.) This will be appropriate if we want to compare each country's concentration against a single benchmark.

In order to achieve this, the two steps are:

1. The standard normalization of the distribution to separate population size from concentration is sufficient here: Normalize the distribution by dividing μ by population size, $\int_d \mu$, which means that we will be taking each country to have a population of size one.

2. Set:

$$(\alpha, \beta) = \left(-\frac{1}{\log(\bar{d})}, 1 \right)$$

where $\bar{d} \equiv \max_{x_i, i} |x_i - \mathbf{C}_i|$ is the maximum distance between a point and the center in any country. This means that we take the (logarithm of the) largest distance between a point and the capital in any country to equal to one.

Maximum distance within unit of analysis Another possibility is to evaluate the index at zero for a given country if its entire population lives as far away from the capital as it is possible to be in that particular country. This is appropriate if we want to compare each country's actual concentration to what its own conceivably lowest level would be.

With that in mind, the two steps are now:

1. Besides the standard normalization by population size, $\int_d \mu$, normalize by $\log(\bar{d}_i)$, where $\bar{d}_i \equiv \max_x |x - \mathbf{C}_i|$ is the maximum distance between a point in country i and that country's capital. This means that we not only take each country's population to be of size one, but also that we take the (logarithm of the) largest distance between a point and the capital of that country to be one as well.

2. Set:

$$(\alpha, \beta) = (-1, 1).$$

¹⁵For instance, in the cross-country implementation later in the paper, the largest recorded distance from the capital city within any country is between the Midway Islands and Washington, DC, in the United States.

Our empirical implementation will illustrate both cases of normalization and their different interpretations.

2.6 Comparison with Other Indices

Comparison with other Centered Indices The first obvious comparison is to other centered indices of spatial concentration used in the literature. Some widely used measures of spatial concentration discard a lot of information, by attaching zero weight to observations located at more than a certain distance from the capital point. One such example of particularly stark nature is the share of individual observations that is right on the capital point; a typical application of such a measure is the share of population of a country that lives in the capital city, or in the main city in that country, as in Ades and Glaeser (1995). The obvious advantage of our approach is that it incorporates all of that information, with enough flexibility to allow for different weights according to the application – as parameterized by the elasticity of the marginal impact function with respect to distance (as in Proposition 2): the greater that elasticity, the less weight is attached to observations that are farther away from the capital point.

However, other widely used measures also incorporate that information. For instance, Galster et al. (2001) use the inverse of the sum of the distances of each observation to the center as a measure of “centrality” in the context of studying urban sprawl. This measure is related to a limit case in our framework where $R_h = 0$, i.e. the impact function h is linear, though the inverse operation used by Galster et al. erases the nice properties of additivity and decomposability. While certainly useful, such *ad hoc* approaches are limited by what an intuitive grasp of the properties of a given space will provide. This intuitive grasp quickly reaches its limits when we move away from specific, concrete applications. Our axiomatic approach, in contrast, guarantees basic desirable properties for our index in any n -dimensional Euclidian space, which ensures wide applicability, to any situation that can be mapped onto such a space. Our approach thus provides a single “language” to codify the concept of spatial concentration around a capital point. In that sense, our CISC is analogous to the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality: it might be less suited than some other measure within a given specific application, but it has robust properties that make it a good measure across a wide variety of applications, and as such it provides a universal language to talk about the concept at hand. On the other

hand, it still retains considerable flexibility – in that it allows for different coefficients R_h and different normalization procedures, as described in the previous subsection – that can help us tailor the index to specific applications, without losing the desirable general properties.

Comparison with Non-Centered Indices of Concentration Besides the obvious distinction that our index is built on the concept of a particular “center”, it also contains considerably more spatial information than non-centered indices. For instance, let us consider the many indices of concentration that are based on measures first designed to deal with inequality – such as the *location Gini coefficient* calculated on a distribution of cells.¹⁶ Such measures do not take into account the actual spatial distribution. Indeed, consider a thought experiment where half of the cells contain exactly one individual observation, and the other half contain zero observations. Such indices do not make any distinction between a situation in which the former cells are all in the East and all the latter cells are in the West, and another situation in which both types are completely mingled together in a chess-board pattern. Generally speaking, this type of measure fails to take into account the relative positions between the cells, which can be highly problematic in many circumstances.¹⁷ In addition, these measures are also highly non-linear with respect to individuals, because they contain a function of the cell distribution. In that sense, they are not grounded at the individual level in the way our CISC is.

These differences are highlighted by the fact that we can actually derive a non-centered index from our centered measure. We can do so by averaging the centric index over all possible centers (i.e. all points) within the support of the distribution, a feasible task in most applications. On \mathbb{R} (say, applied to individual income distributions), this aggregative, non-centered index coincides with the much familiar Gini index of inequality. For now, we leave further explorations on this subject for future work. In any case it is not possible to follow the reverse path and obtain a centered index from a given non-centered measure. This underscores the versatility of our approach.

¹⁶For instance, the *location Gini* is used, *inter alia*, in the context of economic geography (Krugman 1991, Jensen and Kletzer 2005), studies of migration (Rogers and Sweeney 1998), political economy (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

¹⁷The same can be said of cruder measures of concentration, such as population density. A related index that does use spatial information is the measure of compactness developed by Fryer and Holden (2007).

Comparison with Related Indices: Inequality, Segregation, Polarization, Riskiness

Finally, it is worth noting the links between our index and other indices designed to measure other aspects of distributions, be they spatial or not. The connection with inequality measures has already emerged from the very fact that such measures are used to capture spatial concentration, and we have noted that a natural extension of our approach to a non-centered setting highlights an interesting connection with the Gini coefficient. The connection can be pushed further when we realize that a Lorenz-curve-type concentration curve could be formed from spatial distributions: taking the example of population, we can sort individuals according to the distance from the center within which they are located. These curves could be ranked when one dominates another, which can be seen along the lines of Proposition 1: if one distribution “Lorenz”-dominates another, the former’s corresponding index would be higher than the latter’s, for any functional form of the impact function satisfying the specification of Proposition 1. It is well-known, however, that this order is not complete. In that regard, our index implies a population-weighted measure for a complete ranking of concentration curves, which in two-dimensional space is based on the log-scale of distance. This connection is exactly akin to the one emphasized by Echenique and Fryer (2007) with respect to their segregation index: any index that intends to rank distributions that are not in a Lorenz-dominance relationship implies choosing a weighting system, and our axioms give us a well-founded reason to prefer one system to other alternatives. Another analogy could be drawn with the work on polarization by Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) who also provide a particular order of the Lorenz curves that emphasizes concentration around several “poles” rather than around one unique capital.

Another interesting connection is with the measurement of riskiness. A desirable property of a measure of riskiness, as spelled out by Aumann and Serrano (2008) is that it respects first- and second-order stochastic dominance. If we take our distribution to represent the probability that some individual observation is randomly located at a certain point relative to the capital point of interest (not unlike the “dartboard” approach in Ellison and Glaeser 1997), we can take Axioms 2 and 3 to imply that the index respects FOSD. In other words, we can say that a distribution FOSDs another distribution if, for any distance x from the capital point \mathbf{C} , there is a greater probability of an individual observation locating closer to \mathbf{C} than x under the former than under the latter; Axioms 2 and 3 guarantee that the former distribution will be measured by the CISC as having greater concentration. We can even go further and state that our Axiom

6 captures a generalization of SOSD for Euclidian spaces with dimension greater than 1; it is clearly equivalent for the case of a unidimensional space.

3 Application: Population Concentration around Capital Cities

Having established our CISC and discussed its properties, we now move on to illustrate its applicability in practice. We focus on the distribution of population around capital points of interest – capital cities across countries and across US states, and the political center (e.g. the location of city halls) in US metropolitan areas. We will discuss descriptive statistics and basic correlations with variables of interest, and also how the index can be used to shed light on competing theories, using as an example the determinants of the location of capital cities.

3.1 Cross-country implementation

In our first application, we calculate population concentration around capital cities across countries in the world. We use the database *Gridded Population of the World* (GPW), Version 3 from the Socio-Economic Data Center (SEDC) at Columbia University. This dataset, published in 2005, contains the information for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000, and is arguably the most detailed world population map available. Over the course of more than 10 years, these data are gathered from national censuses and transformed into a global grid of 2.5 arc-minute side cells (approximately 5km), with data on population for each of the cells in this grid.¹⁸

We present the two limit cases of our CISC in two-dimensional space. The first case, $R_h = 1$, is the G-CISC, with the logarithmic impact function, and we compute two different normalized versions of it. The first version ($GCISC_1$) is normalized by the maximum distance across countries, and the second version ($GCISC_2$) is normalized by the maximum distance within the country, both as described in section 2.5: the former captures concentration relative to what it could possibly be in any country, while the latter captures concentration relative to what it could possibly be in that specific country.¹⁹ The second case, $R_h = 0$, is the linear

¹⁸We limit our analysis to countries with more than one million inhabitants, since most of the examples with extremely high levels of concentration come from small countries and islands. The results with the full sample are very much similar, however, and are available upon request.

¹⁹While the non-normalized measure may present some interest in itself, we do not report it because of its extremely high correlation with population size, which prevents us from disentangling any independent effect.

impact function, which as a short-hand we will call L-CISC. In the interest of brevity, we will only compute the version normalized by the maximum distance across countries, $LCISC_1$.

We will compare our indices with two alternative measures of concentration. The first alternative is the location Gini coefficient (“*Gini_Pop*”), a non-centered measure that is often used in the literature, and the second one is the share of the population living in the capital city (“*Capital_Primary*”), which provides a benchmark for comparison with another very simple centered index.²⁰

3.1.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 shows the basic descriptive statistics for the different measures, for the three years in the sample, and Table 2 presents their correlation. The first remarkable fact is that there is very little variation over that span of time: the autocorrelation is extremely high, and almost all variation comes from the cross-country dimension. This suggests that the pattern of population distribution is fairly constant within each country, and that a period of 10 years may be too short to see important changes in that pattern. For this reason, we choose to focus on one of the years; we choose 1990 because it is the one that has the highest quality of data, as judged by the SEDC.²¹

[TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE]

Let us start by comparing the basic properties of our indices with those of the comparison measures, noting that the appropriate benchmark for comparison in the case of G-CISC is $GCISC_1$, and not $GCISC_2$, since both location Gini and *Capital_Primary* do not normalize by the geographical size of each country. The striking fact that immediately jumps from Table 2 is that our index captures a very different concept from what the location Gini is capturing: they are *negatively* correlated, both in the case of G-CISC and L-CISC. This underscores the point that typical measures of concentration are ill-suited for getting at the idea of concentration around a given point. This point becomes even more striking when we compare the list of

²⁰We could have included other measures, notably the inverse of the average distance, as used for instance by Galster et al. (2001). We do not do so in the interest of brevity, but it is worth noting that the inverse of the average distance is extremely highly correlated with L-CISC, by construction, since the latter also uses average distances. In this sense, we can essentially reproduce any results to be obtained with such a measure, but with the nice properties attached to the CISC.

²¹Our results are very similar when we use the other two years.

countries with very high and very low levels of concentration, which are displayed in Table 3. We can see that the list of the countries whose population is least concentrated around their capital cities accords very well with what was to be expected: these are by-and-large countries where the capital city is not the largest city. (The exceptions are Russia, on which we will elaborate later, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire, whose capital is located on the far west corner of the country.) By the same token, the list of highly concentrated countries is quite intuitive as well, with Singapore leading the way. The same list for the location Gini, in contrast, surely helps us understand why the correlation between the two is negative. It ranks very highly countries that have big territories and unevenly distributed populations. While this concept of concentration may of course be useful for many applications, it is quite apparent that using non-centered measures of concentration can be very misleading if the application calls for a centered notion of concentration.²²

[TABLE 3 HERE]

In the case of the alternative centered measure of concentration, *Capital Primacy*, Table 2 shows that the correlation is positive, though not overwhelming.²³ Table 3 shows, however, that the ranking of countries that emerges from this measure is completely different from the ones generated by both CISCs.²⁴ This is not surprising, in light of the amount of information that is being discarded by *Capital Primacy*, but another crucial problem with such a coarse measure is clearly apparent from the table: its arbitrariness. Note that Kuwait, which is one of the most concentrated countries in the world according to both CISCs, shows up as one of the *least* concentrated ones as judged by *Capital Primacy*. This is so because the population of what is officially considered as Kuwait City, the capital, is just over 30,000, while the population of the metropolitan area is over two million. This difference of two orders of magnitude is simply due to an arbitrary delimitation of what counts as the capital city. This clearly illustrates the dramatic distortions that can result from discarding relevant information.

²²It is also worth noting that a measure such as location Gini is quite sensitive to how “coarse” the grid that is being used to compute the index is: the fewer cells there are, the lower the location Gini will tend to be. Our index, on the other hand, has the “unbiasedness” feature that we have already discussed.

²³Note also that the maximum value of *Capital Primacy* is greater than one. This is due to the fact that the data for capital city population and total population, used to compute the share, come from different sources; that data point corresponds to Singapore, which should obviously be thought of as having a measure of 1.

²⁴Note that here we use the measure of *Capital Primacy* as computed for 1995. This is because there are many fewer missing values for 1995 than there are for 1990.

We can also compare the two versions of our index, L-CISC and G-CISC, in order to understand the consequences of changes in the elasticity coefficient. Table 2 shows that the correlation between $GCISC_1$ and $LCISC_1$ is positive and quite high, which is reassuring since they both purport to measure the same concept. Nevertheless, there are important empirical differences between the two. The first such difference can be seen from Figure 5, which plots histograms of both indices. We can see from the figure that the distribution of $LCISC_1$ is very skewed, whereas $GCISC_1$ has a more compelling bell-shaped distribution. This implies that the latter is generally less sensitive to extreme observations. Another way to illustrate this difference is to consider a specific comparison, between Brazil and Russia. Russia’s capital, Moscow, is the country’s largest city, and is located at about 600km (slightly less than 400 miles) from the country’s second largest city, St Petersburg. In contrast, Brazil’s capital, Brasília, is now the country’s sixth largest city, and is around 900km (more than 550 miles) away from the country’s largest cities, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, whose combined metropolitan area population is about ten times as large as Brasília’s.²⁵ Table 3 shows that Brazil is ranked to have lower concentration than Russia with $GCISC_1$, but not with $LCISC_1$. This is because $LCISC_1$ gives a larger weight to people who are very far from the capital point of interest; roughly speaking, it gives a relatively large weight to people who are in Vladivostok. This example drives home the point that different choices of the elasticity coefficient lead to different characterizations, thus illustrating the flexibility of our approach.

Finally, we also note an interesting pattern emerging from Table 3, regarding the “size-normalized” version of our G-CISC, $GCISC_2$: the countries with the most concentrated populations seem to be fairly small ones (in terms of territory). This does not arise from “mechanical” reasons, first of all because the measure is normalized for size – the pattern suggests that the population of relatively small countries is more concentrated than that of large ones, *relative* to what it could be. In addition, while the measure for these countries may be less precise because of the small size, and consequent smaller number of grids, we know that our index is unbiased to classical measurement error. We will explore this pattern more systematically in our regression results. We can also note that $GCISC_1$ is typically much higher than $GCISC_2$: a country will have a more concentrated population relative to the maximum distance across

²⁵According to official data, the metro area population of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Brasília is around 19 million, 12 million, and 3 million, respectively.




Figure 5: G-CISC and L-CISC

countries than to the maximum distance within the country itself.

3.1.2 Regression analysis

We can also investigate the correlation patterns of our indices with several variables of interest. We will stop short of providing a discussion of causal inference, as it falls outside the scope of this paper, but we can nevertheless provide some interesting results that can be built upon by future research.

Economic variables We start by regressing G-CISC and L-CISC on a number of economic variables of interest.²⁶ The results are described in Table 4. The first thing to note is that there is a *negative* correlation between land area and concentration around the capital city: countries with larger territories have populations that are less concentrated around the capital. This correlation is robust to the inclusion of a number of controls. It is also worth noting that the correlation between land area and concentration is *positive* when the latter is measured by the Gini coefficient, which is not surprising in light of Table 3, but nevertheless underscores the point that using Gini as a proxy for concentration of population around the capital city is

²⁶All of the variables that are time-variant are measured with a 5-year lag in our main specifications. Experimenting with other lags did not affect the results. All control variables are described in the Appendix.

deeply misleading.

[TABLE 4 HERE]

It is not that surprising that the measures that are not normalized for size will indicate a negative correlation with territorial size. However, our $GCISC_2$ index, which is normalized, also displays a very significant and robust negative correlation, as anticipated from Table 3, which suggests that such correlation is more than a mechanical artifact of the construction of the indices.

The second robust correlation pattern displayed by the different versions of our CISC is as follows: there is a *negative* correlation between the size of population, and how concentrated it is around the capital. In other words, the smaller the country's population is, the more concentrated it is around the capital. One can speculate over the reasons behind this negative correlation; perhaps countries with larger populations are more likely to have other centers of attraction that lead to the equilibrium distribution of population being more dispersed around the capital city. (We should note, however, that in the case of G-CISC the Property of Gravity, which isolates the attraction exerted by the capital point of interest, ensures that the existence of other centers of attraction will not be mechanically built into the index.) It is worth noting that the relationship is weaker for $GCISC_2$, where concentration is normalized by the territorial size of the country. These patterns can and should be the subject of future research.²⁷

Governance variables We have argued elsewhere (Campante and Do 2007) that population concentration is an important determinant of redistributive pressures, particularly so in non-democratic countries. The basic idea, as expressed in Ades and Glaeser (1995), is that proximity to the capital city increases an individual's political influence. This is particularly the case with regard to "non-institutional" channels like demonstrations, insurgencies and revolutions, as opposed to democratic elections. As such, a more concentrated population is more capable of keeping a non-democratic government in check. With that idea in the background, we study the correlation between our measures of concentration and a number of measures of the quality

²⁷One tentative way of probing deeper into this link with population size is to consider the effects of openness. Introducing openness into the regression reduces the coefficient and significance of population size, which may indicate that part of the negative relationship is indeed linked to the relative attraction of the capital city, which may be more pronounced in a more open, outward-oriented economy. The high correlation between openness and population makes it hard to disentangle their effects, however.

of governance, compiled by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006). These results are featured in Table 5.

[TABLE 5 HERE]

The first panel, for the full sample, suggests that there is a positive correlation between population concentration and governance (with the exception of political stability). The more striking pattern emerges, however, when we split the sample between democracies and non-democracies: it is clear that this relationship is present only in non-democratic countries. In this sub-sample, a higher degree of concentration around the capital city predicts higher governance quality as measured by five of the six variables – control of corruption, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and quality of regulation – with an increase of around 30% of standard deviation for an increase of one standard deviation in G-CISC. Essentially no effect is verified for more democratic countries. This is precisely in line with the idea that the concentration of population represents a check on non-democratic governments.

The fact that political stability is the one measure of quality of governance that does not seem to be positively correlated with population concentration is interesting in and of itself. In fact, if we include the other governance variables as controls in a regression with stability as the dependent variable, we see that population concentration has a *negative* and typically significant correlation with stability – both for G-CISC and L-CISC. Moreover, this result is once again verified only for non-democratic countries. This is consistent with the idea that, controlling for the quality of governance in non-democratic polities, the concentration of population around the capital city imposes checks on the incumbent government.²⁸

Table 5 already shows that the significance of the coefficients is generally improved with G-CISC, as opposed to L-CISC. This is not too surprising, in light of the more well-behaved distribution displayed by the former. In fact, we can further establish this comparison, while also considering how our measures of concentration fare when compared to the alternative measures we have been using as benchmarks. For that purpose, we run a “horse race” in which the measures are jointly included, as shown in Table 6 – for brevity, we only present one of the

²⁸These results, which are available upon request, are verified both when stability is measured by the Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) index, and also when it is measured by the average length of tenure experienced by incumbent executives or parties in the previous twenty years. For details on this measure, see Campante, Chor, and Do (2009).

governance measures, namely control of corruption, and focus on the sample of non-democratic countries. It is clear that both G-CISC and L-CISC dominate the alternative measures, and that G-CISC seems to provide the clearest picture of the correlations linking the concentration of population around the capital city and governance.²⁹

[TABLE 6 HERE]

3.1.3 Where to Locate the Capital?

The idea that the capital city is a particularly important point from a political standpoint, and the correlation between the concentration of population around the capital and the extent of the checks on the government suggest that governments – and non-democratic ones in particular – would have an incentive to pick suitable locations for their capital. This draws attention to the endogeneity of the location of the capital city: not only is the concentration of population a variable that is determined in equilibrium, but the concentration patterns can also influence the choice of where to locate the capital. This is another idea that this application of our index enables us to address.

While a full treatment of the different avenues of causality is beyond the scope of this paper, we can nevertheless illustrate how our index can shed light on this topic. More generally, we can illustrate how our index helps approach the issue of the choice of the capital point of interest. Consider a country with a given spatial distribution of its population, and let us think of the problem faced by a ruler with respect to where to locate the country's capital.³⁰ There are centripetal forces that would lead the ruler to consider spots where the concentration would be very high – economies of agglomeration, broadly speaking. But there are other centrifugal forces, such as the aforementioned checks on his power, that would lead him to place the capital in a low-concentration spot. The question is, which of these forces will prevail under which circumstances?

Our index can provide an avenue for answering this question, which we illustrate using G-CISC. For every country, we compute the concentration of population around every single point in that country.³¹ We then specify the point where this concentration reaches its maxi-

²⁹One can once again note that the location Gini goes in the opposite direction of the centered measures.

³⁰The history of changes in the location of capital cities, considered at some length in Campante and Do (2007), is proof that this problem is very often explicitly considered.

³¹More precisely, every single cell in the grid that covers the country.

mum value. Interestingly, for three fourths of the countries (in the year 1990) this maximum-concentration location lies right within the capital city. This high rate is explained in part by the choice to put the capital in a central location, and in part by the fact that being the capital increases the location’s attractiveness to migrants and to economic activity in general. More broadly, the maximum-concentration location is often at the largest city.³²

We can then measure the gap between this site and the actual capital, as an indicator of how far a country’s actual choice of capital is from the point that would maximize the “agglomeration economies”. We regress this distance, normalized by the greatest distance to any point in the country, on a set of political variables using OLS and Tobit regressions. The results are presented in Table 7. When we limit ourselves to non-democratic countries, we see that a higher level of autocracy predicts a greater distance between the capital city and the concentration-maximizing location. Then when we limit ourselves to non-autocratic countries, then a higher level of democracy also predicts a greater distance. When combined together, both variables of autocracy and democracy predict a greater distance: this shows a type of U-shaped relationship, in which the centrifugal forces are strongest in both extremes of autocracy and democracy. This pattern is very robust to the inclusion of many dummy variables, including regional dummies and legal origin dummies. We can speculate that, on the autocratic side, more autocratic governments have greater incentive and/or ability to insulate themselves from popular pressure by locating their capital cities in low-concentration spots. On the democratic side, it is perhaps the case that additional democratic openness will lead to greater decentralization, and a lower level of attraction exerted by the capital. We are far from having a theory to fully account for that at this point, but the stylized fact is quite interesting nonetheless, and we also leave it to future research.

[TABLE 7 HERE]

3.2 US State-level Implementation

Building on the previous section’s discussion on the location of the capital city, there is no better country in which to take our empirical implementation to the regional level than the

³²The exceptions are often illustrative. In China, it is close to Zhengzhou, the largest city in the province of Henan, which is the country’s most populous; in India, similarly, it is in the state of Uttar Pradesh, which is also the most populous. In the US, it is Columbus, OH, right in the middle of the large population concentrations of the East Coast and the Midwest.

United States, with its long tradition of dealing with the issue. Most famously, James Madison elaborated at length on the choice of the site of the capital city, during the 1789 Constitutional convention, arguing that one should “place the government in that spot which will be least removed from every part of the empire,” and that “regard was also to be paid to the centre [sic] of population.” He also pointed out that state capitals had sometimes been placed in “eccentric places,” and that in those cases “we have seen the people struggling to place it where it ought to be.”³³

The force identified by Madison have been very much at play in the case of US states, and our index enables us to get a snapshot of what the outcome has been. Regarding concentration normalized by the size of the territory ($GCISC_2$), shown in Table 8, Illinois is less concentrated around its capital Springfield than any country in the world. Even with country size, its level of concentration is still comparable with Canada, ranking 10 in the world. Not only for Illinois, but many US States where the capital is not the largest city have the level of concentration comparable to the least concentrated countries in the world. On the other hand, the amount of variation is comparable to that of the cross-country implementation, as states such as Rhode Island and Hawaii have levels of concentration that on a par with some of the most concentrated countries in the world. In general, the broad lessons obtained at the cross-country level persist: $GCISC_1$ and $LCISC_1$ generate similar rankings, and the Gini captures a completely different concept.

[TABLE 8 HERE]

3.3 US Metropolitan Area Implementation

Finally, for the sake of completeness, we implement our indices in the context of US metropolitan areas. There is a large literature discussing and measuring urban sprawl in this context, to which we obviously will not do justice. In any event, the concept of sprawl is multidimensional, and many different measures have been used to capture these multiple elements (Galster et al. 2001, Glaeser and Kahn 2003). Our measure of spatial concentration captures what Galster et al. (2001) call “centrality”, and following that paper we compute our indices taking city hall as our capital point of interest. The results for 24 major metropolitan areas are in Table 9.

³³These quotations were obtained from the website *The Founders’ Constitution* (on Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17), available at <http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/>.

[TABLE 9 HERE]

Some of the results are expected – the high levels of concentration in places such as Boston and New York – while others may be somewhat more surprising to the naked eye – such as the middling levels of concentration in Los Angeles, a city that is synonymous with urban sprawl, or perhaps the extremely low level of concentration in San Francisco.³⁴ From a broader perspective, perhaps the most notable feature is how closely linked are the rankings for the three versions of CISC, and how numerically close are $GCISC_1$ and $GCISC_2$ compared to the country- and state-level contexts. The message is simple: when distances are relatively small, as they are bound to be for cities when compared to countries or states, differences in elasticity coefficients or normalization procedures are less important.³⁵

4 Concluding Remarks

We have presented a general, axiomatic approach to building a centered measure of spatial concentration. We show that requiring a few basic properties, meant to be robust across a variety of applications, enables us to pin down a specific class of measures, defined over any Euclidian space. We then go on to illustrate the empirical implementation of the measure, and how this implementation highlights some of the advantages of our index over alternative approaches.

We emphasize that our approach is a very general one, and unapologetically so. Our idea was to build an index that is not model-specific, so that it can provide a common language to operationalize the concept of centered spatial concentration over a broad scope of applications, in geographical and also in more abstract spaces. We certainly hope that it can be widely applied. Empirically, our illustrative implementation also opens up avenues for future research, as the correlations that we are able to point out between our index and a number of variables of interest can be exploited further, with particular attention to issues of causality that are left outside the scope of this paper. An extension of our framework to an aggregate, non-centered measure of concentration is left to future promising research.

³⁴Both results are very much consistent with the findings in Galster et al. (2001).

³⁵It is important to keep in mind that we are talking about relative distances, and not their numerical value: scale does not matter for the CISC!

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A Appendix: Proofs

A.1 Proofs of Propositions 1-2

Before proceeding with the proofs, we state and prove the following Lemma regarding Cauchy's functional equation:

Lemma 1 *A function f on \mathbb{R} satisfying Cauchy's functional equation $f(x) + f(y) = f(x + y)$ for all x, y is called additive. Any continuous additive function must have the form $f(x) = ax$ for some constant a .*

Proof of Lemma 1. It is easy to verify that $f(0) = 0$, and by induction, that $f(mx) = mf(x)$ for any natural number m , which implies $f(\frac{m}{n}) = \frac{m}{n}f(1) \forall m, n \in \mathbb{N}$. Since the set of all rational numbers \mathbb{Q} is dense in \mathbb{R} , the continuity of f implies that $f(x) = xf(1)$ for all real number x .

■

Proof of Proposition 1.

In steps 1-3 of our five-step proof, we first prove that under Axiom 1 the CISC must have an integral form as expressed in Proposition 1; since these steps do not concern the capital point **C** we simplify notation by denoting the CISC as $\mathbf{I}(\mu)$. In step 4, we then show that Axioms 2-3 imply the properties of the impact function, before verifying in step 5 that the formula stated in Proposition 1 satisfies all three Axioms.

Step 1: \mathbf{I} is linear if μ is multiplied by a constant. Take any distribution μ , we prove that $I(\lambda\mu) = \lambda I(\mu)$ for any $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^+$. This follows directly from Lemma 1 and the assumption of continuity of \mathbf{I} .³⁶

Step 2: Define the impact function h . We consider a grid of small square "cells" in \mathbb{R}^n , each cell is of size ϵ . For each cell D , denote μ_D the normalized uniform distribution whose support is D . Now for each point $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ define $h_\epsilon(x)$ as $\mathbf{I}(\mu_D)$ with the grid cell D of size ϵ that contains x . By continuity of \mathbf{I} , we can define the limit of $h_\epsilon(x)$ when $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, which we denote $h(x)$.³⁷

Step 3: \mathbf{I} is the integral of h . Define a step distribution of resolution ϵ any positive distribution with compact support on \mathbb{R}^n such that its restriction on each cell D of size ϵ is a constant (i.e. a multiple of μ_D). A step distribution μ_S of resolution ϵ hence has the form $\sum_{D \in \mathcal{J}} \lambda_D \mu_D$, where \mathcal{J} is the family of all grid cells of size ϵ . From measure theory, we see that any positive distribution μ could be approximated by a sequence of step distributions.

From Step 1 and the additivity of \mathbf{I} , we infer that $\mathbf{I}(\mu_S) = \sum_{D \in \mathcal{J}} \lambda_D \mathbf{I}(\mu_D) = \sum_{D \in \mathcal{J}} \lambda_D h_\epsilon(x_D)$ for a certain collection $\{x_D : x_D \in D\}_{\mathcal{J}}$ of points in each cell. As we consider the sequence of step distributions $\mu_S \rightarrow \mu$ when $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, the right hand side converges to the integral of $h(x)$:

$$\mathbf{I}(\mu) = \int h(x) d\mu.$$

Notice that until this step, only Axiom 1 has been used.

³⁶We find that the continuity of \mathbf{I} is an easily acceptable assumption in economics, as it supposes that no small change in the distribution μ could result in an abrupt drop or surge in concentration. We could also show that under additivity, continuity is equivalent to boundedness of \mathbf{I} over all normalized distributions.

³⁷This claim is not as simple as it sounds, and a rigorous proof would require using generalized functions. Since the intuition is clear enough, we abstain from further complications.

Step 4: h depends only on the distance to \mathbf{C} . Now consider two points x and x' within the same distance from \mathbf{C} . There exists a rotation $\mathcal{R}_{(\mathbf{C}, M)}$ that maps x to x' . Take a distribution μ_x in a neighborhood of x : its image through $\mathcal{R}_{(\mathbf{C}, \theta)}$ is a neighborhood of x' , and is denoted $\mu_{x'}$. The Axiom of Direction Invariance implies that $\mathbf{I}(\mu_x, \mathbf{C}) = \mathbf{I}(\mu_{x'}, \mathbf{C})$. When we let the distribution μ_x tend towards a mass point distribution at x , $\mathbf{I}(\mu_x, \mathbf{C}) \rightarrow h(x)$ and $\mathbf{I}(\mu_{x'}, \mathbf{C}) \rightarrow h(x')$. The impact function h must therefore be rotation-invariant as well: it could be then renamed as a function of the distance from each point x to \mathbf{C} , i.e. $h(|x - \mathbf{C}|)$.

A similar consideration of a neighborhood of x shows that in order to satisfy the Axiom Squeeze Monotonicity, $h(|x - \mathbf{C}|) \leq h(\rho|x - \mathbf{C}|) \forall 0 \leq \rho \leq 1$. It follows that $h(d)$ needs to be a decreasing function.

Step 5: Check that the CISC satisfies Axioms 1-3. This final step is straightforward, as for all positive distributions μ , $\int h(|x - \mathbf{C}|)d\mu$ clearly satisfies additivity with respect to the distribution μ , monotonicity when μ is squeezed towards \mathbf{C} , and invariance when μ is rotated around \mathbf{C} . ■

Proof of Proposition 2.

We proceed to prove that Axiom 4 imposes the functional forms stated in Proposition 2 in four steps, before verifying that the converse is true. As stated in Proposition 1, $h(r)$ is integrable and decreasing in r ; we do not need to assume that h is continuous, or reaches finite limits at $r \rightarrow 0$ and $r \rightarrow \infty$. In what follows, we consider the case of population distributions on the real line \mathbb{R} , noticing that the proof is identical for higher dimensions. Since we will not touch on the position of the capital point \mathbf{C} , we will once again simplify the notation of the CISC as $\mathbf{I}(\mu)$.

Step 1: Find a particular property of h . First, order preservation means that for any two equal size distributions μ and ν (i.e. $\int d\mu = \int d\nu$) if $\mathbf{I}(\mu) = \mathbf{I}(\nu)$, then for all ρ positive: $\mathbf{I}(\mathcal{S}_{(\mathbf{C}, \rho)}(\mu)) = \mathbf{I}(\mathcal{S}_{(\mathbf{C}, \rho)}(\nu))$. (This comes from the observation that $\mathbf{I}(\mu) \geq \mathbf{I}(\nu)$ and $\mathbf{I}(\mu) \leq \mathbf{I}(\nu)$ at the same time.)

For any numbers $x > 1 > y$, consider two population distributions μ and ν such that $\int d\mu = \int d\nu$ and $\mathbf{I}(\mu) = \mathbf{I}(\nu)$. μ consists of two blocks: μ_x on the range $r \in [x - \epsilon, x + \epsilon]$ of density $\mu_x(r) = M_\epsilon$, and μ_y on the range $r \in [y - \epsilon, y + \epsilon]$ of density $\mu_y(r) = 1 - M_\epsilon$: $\mu = \mu_x + \mu_y$. ν consists of one single block on the range $r \in [1 - \epsilon, 1 + \epsilon]$ of density $\nu(r) = 1$. It is easy to verify that $\int d\mu = \int d\nu$. For the equality $\mathbf{I}(\mu) = \mathbf{I}(\nu)$ one only needs to choose an appropriate M_ϵ so that $M_\epsilon \mathbf{I}(\mu_x) + (1 - M_\epsilon) \mathbf{I}(\mu_y) = \mathbf{I}(\nu)$. Notice that when $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, the ratios $\mathbf{I}(\mu_i)/\mathbf{I}(\nu)$, $i = x, y$ tend to $h(i)/h(1)$, $i = x, y$, also implying that there is a finite limit $\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} M_\epsilon = M$. We could then rewrite the equality $\mathbf{I}(\mu) = \mathbf{I}(\nu)$ at the limit when $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ as follows:

$$Mh(x) + (1 - M)h(y) = h(1).$$

Now thanks to Axiom 4, by rescaling both μ and ν by a factor $k > 0$ we obtain a similar equality: $Mh(kx) + (1 - M)h(ky) = h(k)$. Combining the two equalities and eliminating M , we obtain:

$$\frac{h(kx) - h(ky)}{h(x) - h(y)} = \frac{h(ky) - h(k)}{h(y) - h(1)}.$$

In other words, the left hand side does not depend on x . Given the symmetric roles that x and y play, it is immediate that the left hand side term does not depend on y either. It thus is a function of only k :

$$\frac{h(kx) - h(ky)}{h(x) - h(y)} = g(k). \quad (5)$$

This equation also holds for $x, y > 1$ or $0 < x, y < 1$, since if $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{c}{d}$ then $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{c}{d} = \frac{a+c}{b+d}$. Equation (5) concludes Step 1.

Step 2: Solve for $g(k)$. Further investigation of equation (5) shows that: $g(k)g(l) = g(kl) \forall k, l > 0$. We also notice that since h is decreasing on $[0, \infty)$, the set of x 's where h is discontinuous must be at most countable, thus we could find at least two points x and y where h is continuous. Then, by studying the neighborhood of any point k with the replacement (x, y) by $(x/k, y/k)$ in equation 5, we reach the conclusion that $g(k)$ is a continuous function of k .

Using Lemma 1 while noting that the function $\gamma(x) \stackrel{def}{=} \log(g(e^x))$ is well-defined on \mathbb{R} , additive and continuous, we conclude that g must be of the form $g(k) = k^\alpha$.

Step 3: Show that $h(x)$ is differentiable. We replace (x, y) in equation (5) by $(k^n x, k^{n-1} x)$, $n = 1, 2, \dots$ and rearrange the terms to deduce by induction that:

$$h(k^n x) - h(k^{n-1} x) = k^\alpha (h(k^{n-1} x) - h(k^{n-2} x)) = \dots = k^{\alpha(n-1)} (h(kx) - h(x)),$$

from which we obtain by adding up all the differences:

$$h(k^n x) - h(x) = \frac{k^{\alpha n} - 1}{k^\alpha - 1} (h(kx) - h(x)). \quad (6)$$

We reason by absurd: suppose that $h(x)$ is not differentiable at x , i.e. there exist two sequences $({}_1x_i)$ and $({}_2x_i)$ both converging to x , but producing two different limits of $\frac{f(x_i)-f(x)}{x_i-x}$: these two series would also produce two different limits of $\frac{f(x_i)-f(x)}{x_i^\alpha-x} \stackrel{def}{=} D\alpha(x_i, x) \leq 0$, namely $D\alpha_1$ and $D\alpha_2$. Suppose $D\alpha_1 - D\alpha_2 = \epsilon > 0$. For convenience, we only consider the case where members of both sequences are greater than x (the other case is identical, by a change of variable). Given any $\delta > 0$, there exist k_1 and k_2 in the interval $(1, 1 + \delta)$ such that $k_1 x \in ({}_1x_i)$ and $k_2 x \in ({}_2x_i)$. For any $\eta > 0$, we could find natural numbers m and n such that $k_2^{n\alpha} + \eta \geq k_1^{m\alpha} \geq k_2^{n\alpha}$ (by choosing a rational number $\frac{m}{n}$ bigger than, yet as close to $\frac{\log k_2}{\log k_1}$ as possible). From equation (6), we obtain: $h(k_1^m x) = D\alpha(k_1 x, x)(k_1^{\alpha m} - 1) + h(x)$ and $h(k_2^n x) = D\alpha(k_2 x, x)(k_2^{\alpha n} - 1) + h(x)$.

Here we could choose δ small enough so that $D\alpha(k_1 x, x)$ and $D\alpha(k_2 x, x)$ are very close to $D\alpha_1$ and $D\alpha_2$, such that $D\alpha(k_1 x, x) - D\alpha(k_2 x, x) > \frac{1}{2}\epsilon > 0$. It follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 > D\alpha(k_1 x, x)(k_1^{\alpha m} - 1) &> D\alpha(k_2 x, x)(k_2^{\alpha n} + \eta - 1) + \frac{1}{2}\epsilon(k_2^{\alpha n} + \eta - 1) \\ &= D\alpha(k_2 x, x)(k_2^{\alpha n} - 1) + \frac{1}{2}\epsilon(k_2^{\alpha n} + \eta - 1) + D\alpha(k_2 x, x)\eta \\ &> D\alpha(k_2 x, x)(k_2^{\alpha n} - 1), \end{aligned}$$

when we choose η to be very small compared to $k_2^{\alpha n}$. The last inequality implies that $h(k_1^m x) > h(k_2^n x)$, in contradiction with $k_1^m > k_2^n$ and h being a decreasing function. We have thus proved by absurd that h is differentiable everywhere.

Step 4: Solve for h . This last step is straightforward: from equation (5), by fixing $y = 1$ and bringing x towards 1 we obtain: $h'(k) = k^{\alpha-1}h'(1)$. Consequently, the function h must have the form: $h(r) = ar^\alpha + b$ or $h(r) = a \log r + b$ in case $\alpha = 0$, with constants a, b ($a < 0$).

Step 5: Check that the CISC satisfies Axiom 4. In case $h(r) = ar^\alpha$ a squeeze of two normalized distributions μ and ν towards \mathbf{C} by a factor ρ would change the CISC of both by the same factor. In case $h(r) = a \log r$ such a squeeze would add the same term to the CISC of both. Finally, the conclusion remains valid when one adds a constant to $h(r)$. ■

A.2 Digression on Harmonic Function Theory

Before proving Proposition 3, we present a digression on harmonic function theory.

Definition 5 (Harmonic Function) *A real function $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ is said to be harmonic on an open domain D of \mathbb{R}^n if it satisfies the Laplace equation over that domain (provided the partial derivatives are well defined):*

$$\Delta f \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_1^2} + \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_2^2} + \dots + \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_n^2} \equiv 0.$$

We can also define super- and sub-harmonic functions: the Laplace equation, when considered as an inequality, further refines the space \mathcal{C}^2 into the subspaces of super- and sub-harmonic functions. More precisely:

Definition 6 (Super-/Sub-harmonic functions) *Given $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ a regular real-valued function on an open domain D of \mathbb{R}^n . It is said to be super-harmonic on D if $\Delta f \leq 0$. It is said to be sub-harmonic if $-f$ is super-harmonic.*

Axler et al. (2001) covers the basics of harmonic function theory. In particular, a harmonic function transformed through a summation, scalar multiplication, translation, squeeze, rotation or partial/directional differentiation is still a harmonic function. The essential property of harmonic functions is its Mean Value Property, stated as follows:

Mean Value Property *Given a ball $\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, r)$ within the open domain $D \subset \mathbb{R}^n$, its sphere $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, r) = \partial\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, r)$, and a harmonic function f on D . The mean of f on the sphere is equal to the value of f at the center of the sphere:*

$$\mathcal{M}_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, r)}(f) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{1}{\sigma_{\mathbf{S}}(\mathbf{S})} \int_{\mathbf{S}} f(x) d\sigma_{\mathbf{S}} = f(\mathbf{T}), \quad (7)$$

where $\sigma_{\mathbf{S}}$ is the uniform surface measure on the sphere S . Conversely, a function f satisfying this property over D must be harmonic on D .

In order to prove this property we will use Green's identity, stated in the following lemma:

Lemma 2 (Green's identity) *Given a regular open domain $\Omega \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ with regular boundary $\partial\Omega$, and regular functions u and v , as well as volume measure $d\nu$ and surface measure $d\sigma$:*

$$\int_{\Omega} (u\Delta v - v\Delta u) d\nu = \int_{\partial\Omega} (uD_{\mathbf{n}}v - vD_{\mathbf{n}}u) d\sigma,$$

where $D_{\mathbf{n}}$ is the Gateaux-derivative with respect to the normal vector that points outward of the domain Ω .

Proof of Lemma 2. The divergence theorem intuitively states that the change in volume of a vector field within a domain is equal to the net flow in into that domain:

$$\int_{\Omega} \nabla \cdot \mathbf{w} d\nu = \int_{\partial\Omega} \mathbf{w} \cdot \mathbf{n} d\sigma,$$

where $\nabla \cdot \mathbf{w} = \sum_i \frac{\partial w_i}{\partial x_i}$. Replace the field \mathbf{w} by $u\nabla v - v\nabla u$, noting that $u\nabla v \cdot \mathbf{n} = uD_{\mathbf{n}}v$ and $\nabla \cdot (u\nabla v) = u\Delta v$ and we obtain Green's identity. ■

Proof of the Mean Value Property.

Step 1: Proof of (7) for harmonic functions. First consider a C^2 function f on the domain D containing $\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, r)$, and apply Green's identity with $u = f$ and $v = 1$ on any ball $\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, t)$ with $0 < t \leq r$ to obtain:

$$\int_{\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, t)} \Delta f d\nu = \int_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, t)} D_{\mathbf{n}} f d\sigma$$

The right hand side integral is converted to an integral on the unit sphere $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, 1)$:

$$\int_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, t)} D_{\mathbf{n}} f d\sigma = t^{n-1} \int_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, 1)} \frac{\partial}{\partial t} f(\mathbf{T} + t\mathbf{E}) d\sigma(\mathbf{E}) = t^{n-1} \frac{d}{dt} \int_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, 1)} f(\mathbf{T} + t\mathbf{E}) d\sigma(\mathbf{E})$$

(the differentiation under the integral sign is possible in this case), while the left hand side is:

$$\int_{\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, t)} \Delta f d\nu = t^n \int_{\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, 1)} \Delta f(\mathbf{T} + t\mathbf{E}) d\nu(\mathbf{E}).$$

Put together these equalities, noting that $\sigma(\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, 1)) = n\nu(\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, 1))$ we obtain:

$$t\mathcal{M}_{\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, t)}(\Delta f) = n \frac{d}{dt} \mathcal{M}_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, t)}(f), \quad (8)$$

where \mathcal{M} denotes the mean of a function on a domain. From equation (8), when the function f is harmonic ($\Delta f \equiv 0$) $\mathcal{M}_{\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, t)}(f)$ is constant on $t \in (0, r]$, thus by continuity is equal to its value at $t = 0$:

$$\mathcal{M}_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, r)}(f) = f(\mathbf{T}).$$

Step 2: Proof of the converse. Notice that the mean value property implies that the function f must be of class $C^\infty(D)$ (a formal proof could be found in Armitage and Gardiner (2001)). Therefore we obtain equation (8), which when integrated over t implies:

$$n(\mathcal{M}_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, r)}(f) - f(\mathbf{T})) = \int_0^r t\mathcal{M}_{\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, t)}(\Delta f) dt.$$

As $\mathcal{M}_{\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, t)}(\Delta f) \rightarrow \Delta f(\mathbf{T})$ when $t \rightarrow 0+$, the right hand side is approximated by $\frac{1}{2}r^2\Delta f(\mathbf{T})$ when $r \rightarrow 0+$. We deduce:

$$\Delta f(\mathbf{T}) = 2 \lim_{r \rightarrow 0+} r^{-2}(\mathcal{M}_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, r)}(f) - f(\mathbf{T})). \quad (9)$$

When f satisfies the Mean Value Property, the expression under the limit sign is 0, implying that $\Delta f = 0$ at all \mathbf{T} , i.e. f is harmonic. ■

The Mean Value Property and its converse are adapted to the case of super-and sub-harmonic functions as inequalities of the Mean Value, stated as follow:

Mean Value Inequality *Given a sphere $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, r)$ whose ball $\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, r)$ lies completely within the open domain $D \subset \mathbb{R}^n$, and a super-harmonic (sub-harmonic) function f on D . The mean of f on the sphere is less (greater) than or equal to the value of f at the center of the sphere, namely:*

$$\mathcal{M}_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, r)}(f) \leq (\geq) f(\mathbf{T}), \quad (10)$$

Conversely, if f satisfies the mean value inequality in (10) with a \leq (\geq) sign, then f is super-harmonic (sub-harmonic) on D .

Proof of the Mean Value Inequality. We present the proof for the super-harmonic case. For sub-harmonic functions the proof is almost identical.³⁸

First, given a smooth super-harmonic function f on D . Equation (8) and the condition $\Delta f \leq 0$ implies that the $\mathcal{M}_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T},t)}(f)$ is decreasing in t for $t \geq 0$. Since its limit when $t \rightarrow 0+$ is $f(\mathbf{T})$, it follows that $\mathcal{M}_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T},r)}(f) \leq f(\mathbf{T})$.

Conversely, when the Mean Value Inequality is satisfied, equation (9) implies that $\Delta f \leq 0$ at any point \mathbf{T} , i.e. f is super-harmonic. ■

Intuitively, real-valued super- and sub-harmonic functions on \mathbb{R}^n could be viewed as more “demanding” versions of concave and convex functions. As we will show, under the assumption of directional invariance these concepts provide a strong refinement of the class of real functions on the plane, compared to the concepts of concavity and convexity.³⁹

A.3 Proof of Proposition 3

Proof of Proposition 3. In steps 1-3 we prove that Axioms 5 and 6 are equivalent to the boundary restrictions on $R_h(d)$, and in the last step we show when the inequality in Axiom 6 becomes an equality.

Step 1: Lower bound of $R_h(d)$. The lower bound comes directly from Axiom 5, and the claim from Proposition 1 that $h' < 0$.

Before proceeding to Step 2, we need the following result:

Lemma 3 *For a smooth function $h(|x - \mathbf{C}|)$ in $\mathbb{R}^n \setminus \{\mathbf{C}\}$, we have:*

$$\Delta h(|x - \mathbf{C}|) = h''(|x - \mathbf{C}|) + \frac{(n-1)}{|x - \mathbf{C}|} h'(|x - \mathbf{C}|).$$

Proof of Lemma 3. Straightforward algebra shows Lemma 3:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta h(|x - \mathbf{C}|) &= \sum_1^n \frac{\partial^2 h(|x - \mathbf{C}|)}{\partial x_i^2} = \sum_1^n \frac{\partial \left(h' \cdot \frac{x_i}{|x - \mathbf{C}|} \right)}{\partial x_i} \\ &= \sum_1^n \left(h'' \cdot \frac{x_i^2}{|x - \mathbf{C}|^2} + h' \cdot \left(\frac{1}{|x - \mathbf{C}|} - \frac{x_i^2}{|x - \mathbf{C}|^3} \right) \right) \\ &= h''(|x - \mathbf{C}|) + \frac{(n-1)}{|x - \mathbf{C}|} h'(|x - \mathbf{C}|). \end{aligned}$$

■

Step 2: Upper bound of $R_h(d)$. Given Proposition 1, Axiom 6 implies that for all \mathbf{T} , the following inequality holds:

$$\int_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T},r)} h(|x - \mathbf{C}|) d\eta \leq \int_{\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T},\rho r)} h(|x - \mathbf{C}|) d\mathcal{S}_{(\mathbf{T},\rho)}(\eta). \quad (11)$$

³⁸The proof presented here applies to sufficiently smooth functions. A more general proof for upper/lower-semicontinuous functions could be found in Ransford (1995).

³⁹For isotropic functions on \mathbb{R}^n concavity and convexity is of little interest, since these concepts are respectively equivalent to the function being increasing (decreasing) in the distance to center. Besides, an isotropic function that is both concave and convex on \mathbb{R}^n must be constant.

Letting $\rho \rightarrow 0$, this inequality becomes the Mean Value Inequality in (10) for all points \mathbf{T} within the domain $\mathbb{R}^n \setminus \{\mathbf{C}\}$. Thus the impact function $h(|x - \mathbf{C}|)$ must be super-harmonic on $\mathbb{R}^n \setminus \{\mathbf{C}\}$, implying $\Delta h(|x - \mathbf{C}|) \leq 0$. By Lemma 3, it follows that:

$$R_h(|x - \mathbf{C}|) = -\frac{|x - \mathbf{C}|h''(|x - \mathbf{C}|)}{h'(|x - \mathbf{C}|)} \leq n - 1.$$

Step 3: Converse. Given a super-harmonic impact function h on $\mathbb{R}^n \setminus \{\mathbf{C}\}$, equation (8) shows that the mean value of h over the sphere $\mathbf{S}(\mathbf{T}, \rho r)$ is decreasing in ρ , implying inequality (11) on that domain. It follows that the inequality in Axiom 6 is satisfied for all circumference of center \mathbf{T} and radius r such that the ball $\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, r) \subset \mathbb{R}^n \setminus \{\mathbf{C}\}$. The converse proof is completed with the remark that when $\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, r) \not\subset \mathbb{R}^n \setminus \{\mathbf{C}\}$, it means that $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbf{B}(\mathbf{T}, r)$, so squeezing a uniform distribution on that circumference will automatically bring every point closer to \mathbf{C} , thus by Axiom 2 the CISC will increase.

Step 4: When $R_h(d)$ attains its upper bound. $R_h(d)$ attains its upper bound if and only if $\Delta h(|x - \mathbf{C}|) = 0$, i.e. when $h(|x - \mathbf{C}|)$ is harmonic on $\mathbb{R}^n \setminus \{\mathbf{C}\}$. The Mean Value Property then holds, implying that the inequality in Axiom 6 becomes an equality.

■

B Appendix: Data Description

Population Concentration Index: The measures $G - CISC$'s and $L - CISC$'s are calculated and normalized as explained in the text, using original gridded population maps from the database *Gridded Population of the World* (GPW), Version 3 from the Socio-Economic Data Center, Columbia University (2005), containing maps in 1990, 1995 and 2000 of a global grid of 2.5 arc-minute side cells (approximately 5km).

Alternative Indices of Concentration: The alternative indices of concentration are also produced from the same dataset. The location Gini (noted in the Tables as “Gini Pop”) is calculated as the Gini coefficient of inequality of a special sample, in which each “individual” corresponds to a gridded cell on the map, and each individual’s “income” corresponds to the size of the population living within that cell. “Cap Prim” (Capital city primacy) is calculated as the share of the capital city population over the total population. “Share Largest Point” and “Share Largest Urban Extent” are calculated as the ratio of respectively the largest settlement point and the largest urban extent over the total population. These population figures come directly from the SEDC.

Gap to concentration maximizing location: This variable is calculated for each country by measuring the distance between the actual site of the capital city, and the site of the capital that would maximize the G-CISC. The maximization is done with Matlab’s large scale search method (with analytical gradient matrix), from a grid of 50 initial guesses evenly distributed on the country’s map for large countries.

Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (KKM): From KKM’s (2006) indices, including Voice and Accountability, Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability, and Regulation Quality, themselves a composite of different agency ratings aggregated by an unobserved components methodology. On a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 . Data are available for 1996-2002 at two-year intervals, and thereafter for 2002-2005 on an annual basis. We use the data in 1996 for our measure of population concentration in 1990. KKM data available at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/pdf/2005kkdata.xls>

Real GDP per capita: From the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). Real PPP-adjusted GDP per capita (in constant 2000 international dollars).

Population by year: From the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).

Democracy: Polity IV democracy score, on a scale of 0 to 10.

Autocracy: Polity IV autocracy score, on a scale of 0 to 10.

Polity: Polity IV composite score as Democracy minus Autocracy, on a scale of -10 to 10.

The reference date for the annual observations in the Polity IV dataset is 31 December of each year. We match these to the data corresponding to 1 January of the following year for consistency with the DPI. Data available at: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/>

Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization: From Alesina et al. (2003). percentage of total merchandise exports.

a percentage of total merchandise exports.

Openness and Trade variables: From the WDI. Openness measure equals the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP.

Government Expenditure: From the WDI. Total government consumption expenditure as a share of GDP.

Legal Origin: From La Porta et al. (1999). Dummy variables for British, French, Scandinavian, German, and socialist legal origin.

Region dummies: Following the World Bank's classifications, dummy variables for: East Asia and the Pacific; East Europe and Central Asia; Middle East and North America; South Asia; West Europe; North America; Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean.

TABLE 1
Cross Country Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
GCISC₁ 90	156	0.4639	0.0971	0.2455	0.7641
GCISC₁ 95	156	0.4644	0.0971	0.2439	0.7641
GCISC₁ 00	156	0.4648	0.0971	0.2418	0.7641
GCISC₂ 90	156	0.2527	0.0737	0.1047	0.5820
GCISC₂ 95	156	0.2534	0.0736	0.1004	0.5820
GCISC₂ 00	156	0.2540	0.0737	0.0973	0.5820
LCISC₁ 90	156	0.9678	0.0295	0.8347	0.9989
LCISC₁ 95	156	0.9679	0.0295	0.8326	0.9989
LCISC₁ 00	156	0.9679	0.0295	0.8301	0.9989
Gini Pop 90	156	0.6496	0.1588	0.1388	0.9869
Gini Pop 95	156	0.6515	0.1580	0.1244	0.9872
Gini Pop 00	156	0.6538	0.1569	0.1097	0.9877
Capital Primacy 90	110	0.1226	0.1268	0.0016	1.0337
Capital Primacy 95	156	0.1174	0.1182	0.0011	1.1016
Capital Primacy 00	156	0.1210	0.1153	0.0011	1.0241
GCISC₁ Growth 90-95	156	0.0005	0.0026	-0.0129	0.0109
GCISC₁ Growth 95-00	156	0.0004	0.0023	-0.0069	0.0116

TABLE 2
Cross Country Correlation

	GCISC₁ 90	GCISC₁ 95	GCISC₁ 00	GCISC₂ 90	GCISC₂ 95	GCISC₂ 00	LCISC₁ 90	LCISC₁ 95	LCISC₁ 00	Gini Pop 90	Gini Pop 95	Gini Pop 00	Cap Prim 90	Cap Prim 95
GCISC₁ 90	1													
GCISC₁ 95	0.9997	1												
GCISC₁ 00	0.999	0.9997	1											
GCISC₂ 90	0.6326	0.6314	0.6298	1										
GCISC₂ 95	0.6352	0.6351	0.6346	0.9988	1									
GCISC₂ 00	0.636	0.6369	0.6375	0.9953	0.9988	1								
LCISC₁ 90	0.8453	0.845	0.8442	0.3548	0.3573	0.3584	1							
LCISC₁ 95	0.846	0.846	0.8454	0.3547	0.3576	0.3591	0.9998	1						
LCISC₁ 00	0.8463	0.8465	0.8461	0.3542	0.3575	0.3595	0.9993	0.9998	1					
Gini Pop 90	-0.2678	-0.2718	-0.2754	0.3652	0.3555	0.3455	-0.4054	-0.408	-0.4099	1				
Gini Pop 95	-0.2699	-0.2732	-0.276	0.3662	0.3581	0.3499	-0.4072	-0.4096	-0.4114	0.9987	1			
Gini Pop 00	-0.2708	-0.2733	-0.2753	0.3663	0.3601	0.3537	-0.4074	-0.4096	-0.4112	0.9942	0.9984	1		
Cap Prim 90	0.4807	0.4792	0.4775	0.3814	0.3787	0.3749	0.3081	0.309	0.3096	-0.073	-0.0748	-0.0773	1	
Cap Prim 95	0.4751	0.4739	0.4724	0.3733	0.371	0.3677	0.2995	0.3004	0.301	-0.0807	-0.0825	-0.0848	0.9979	1
Cap Prim 00	0.4746	0.4736	0.4724	0.3855	0.3837	0.3809	0.3033	0.3044	0.3052	-0.0754	-0.0765	-0.0782	0.9961	0.9979

Table 3: Ranking by GCISC₁ 90

Code	Country	GCISC₁ 90	Rank GCISC₁ 90	GCISC₂ 90	Rank GCISC₂ 90	LCISC₁ 90	Rank LCISC₁ 90	Gini Pop 90	Rank Gini Pop 90	Capital Primacy 95	Rank Capital Primacy 95
USA	United States	0.2455	1	0.2455	74	0.8347	1	0.9139	149	0.0022	4
BRA	Brazil	0.2467	2	0.1471	12	0.8809	6	0.8518	140	0.0116	12
CHN	China	0.2511	3	0.1688	21	0.8760	4	0.7507	113	0.0085	9
ZAF(b)	South Africa (Cape Town)	0.2631	4	0.1047	1	0.8774	5	0.9230	150	0.0522	45
RUS	Russian	0.2691	5	0.2501	77	0.8388	2	0.9298	153	0.0636	52
IND	India	0.2704	6	0.1708	22	0.8895	7	0.5405	39	0.0097	10
MOZ	Mozambique	0.2900	7	0.1449	11	0.8918	8	0.6613	88	0.0524	47
KAZ	Kazakhstan	0.2983	8	0.1487	14	0.9165	11	0.7502	112	0.0190	18
ZAR	Congo Kinshasa (DR)	0.2985	9	0.1563	15	0.8928	9	0.6063	58	0.0822	73
CAN	Canada	0.3014	10	0.2435	72	0.8726	3	0.9869	156	0.0264	25
PRI	Puerto Rico	0.6215	147	0.3541	146	0.9948	150	0.4932	21	0.1063	91
SLV	El Salvador	0.6283	148	0.3446	142	0.9946	148	0.5312	37	0.0794	69
CRI	Costa Rica	0.6315	149	0.3919	152	0.9939	145	0.6543	86	0.0752	62
ARM	Armenia	0.6446	150	0.4040	154	0.9948	151	0.5645	50	0.3317	153
TTO	Trinidad and Tobago	0.6478	151	0.3458	144	0.9962	154	0.6136	62	0.0367	31
LBN	Lebanon	0.6484	152	0.3283	137	0.9954	152	0.5957	56	0.3259	151
JOR	Jordan	0.6520	153	0.4501	155	0.9947	149	0.8840	147	0.2411	141
KWT	Kuwait	0.6653	154	0.3841	149	0.9963	155	0.7319	104	0.0170	15
MUS	Mauritius	0.7038	155	0.5820	156	0.9961	153	0.6268	70	0.1082	93
SGP	Singapore	0.7641	156	0.3529	145	0.9989	156	0.5162	28	1.1016	156

Table 4: Predictors of Population Concentration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	GCISC ₁		GCISC ₂		LCISC ₁		Gini Pop	
Log Population	-0.00831** [0.00393]	-0.00951** [0.00385]	-0.008 [0.00610]	-0.00989* [0.00582]	-0.00456*** [0.00159]	-0.00620*** [0.00156]	-0.0186* [0.0102]	-0.002 [0.0127]
Log Land Area	-0.0476*** [0.00262]	-0.0465*** [0.00264]	-0.0145*** [0.00531]	-0.0147** [0.00573]	-0.0118*** [0.00153]	-0.00884*** [0.00104]	0.0587*** [0.00844]	0.0446*** [0.00940]
Log GDP per capita	0.003 [0.00354]	0.005 [0.00871]	0.0121** [0.00591]	0.010 [0.0131]	-0.002 [0.00186]	-0.00526* [0.00309]	0.0566*** [0.0104]	0.0750*** [0.0240]
Polity Score		-0.001 [0.000732]		0.001 [0.00144]		0.000 [0.000261]		0.004 [0.00234]
Ethno-Linguistic Frac		-0.024 [0.0201]		-0.038 [0.0325]		-0.004 [0.00630]		0.129* [0.0654]
Region FE		YES		YES		YES		YES
Legal Origin FE		YES		YES		YES		YES
Observations	113	108	113	108	113	108	113	108
R-squared	0.817	0.868	0.222	0.462	0.657	0.783	0.421	0.578

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Intercepts omitted. Robust standard errors in brackets. All independent variables are taken with a 5-year lag. G-CISC and L-CISC are both for 1990.

See Appendix for description of variables and sources.

Table 5: Governance and Population Concentration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Control of Corruption	Voice & Accountability	Government Effectiveness	Rule of Law	Regulation Quality	Political Stability	Control of Corruption	Voice & Accountability	Government Effectiveness	Rule of Law	Regulation Quality	Political Stability
A. Full Sample												
GCISC	0.837	0.776*	1.369**	1.026*	1.798**	-0.378						
	[0.763]	[0.404]	[0.590]	[0.529]	[0.737]	[0.825]						
LCISC							1.338	2.006	2.807	2.558*	5.499***	-1.305
							[2.057]	[1.464]	[1.984]	[1.525]	[1.888]	[2.874]
Obs	128	134	134	134	134	134	128	134	134	134	134	134
R2	0.81	0.862	0.866	0.698	0.864	0.541	0.808	0.86	0.864	0.692	0.859	0.541
B. More Democratic Countries												
GCISC	-0.966	-0.0186	0.685	0.426	0.625	0.148						
	[0.951]	[0.646]	[0.767]	[0.644]	[0.863]	[1.134]						
LCISC							-3.807	-1.781	0.224	0.684	3.521	-0.441
							[2.555]	[1.994]	[2.428]	[2.065]	[2.269]	[3.730]
Obs	78	80	80	80	80	80	78	80	80	80	80	80
R2	0.84	0.813	0.891	0.888	0.682	0.675	0.841	0.815	0.889	0.888	0.686	0.675
C. Less Democratic Countries												
GCISC	3.553***	2.370***	2.034*	1.512*	1.846	-1.083						
	[0.888]	[0.683]	[1.059]	[0.849]	[1.147]	[1.461]						
LCISC							11.02***	7.426**	4.052	3.434	3.608	3.274
							[3.777]	[3.474]	[3.959]	[2.674]	[3.607]	[6.168]
Obs	50	54	54	54	54	54	50	54	54	54	54	54
R2	0.697	0.617	0.7	0.765	0.598	0.387	0.677	0.597	0.676	0.754	0.582	0.385

Intercept omitted. Robust standard errors in brackets. All regressions include Log GDP per capita, Log Population, Polity, and Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, plus Region and Legal Origin FEs. Panel B consists of countries with polity score larger than 5, Panel C consists of countries with polity score less than or equal to 5. GCISC and LCISC are both for 1990. Independent variables are taken with lag. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Control of Corruption and Population Concentration in Less Democratic Countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
GCISC ₁ 90	2.739** [1.186]	3.908*** [0.918]	3.270*** [0.958]		
LCISC ₁ 90	4.387 [4.272]			10.89*** [3.883]	10.46*** [3.691]
Gini Pop 90		-0.784 [0.541]		-0.255 [0.536]	
Cap Prim 95			0.325 [0.500]		0.818 [0.488]
Observations	50	50	50	50	50
R-squared	0.703	0.713	0.7	0.678	0.696

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Intercepts omitted. Robust standard errors in brackets. All regressions include Log GDP per capita, Log Population, Polity, and Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, plus Region and Legal Origin Fes. All independent variables are taken with a 5-year lag.

See Appendix for description of variables and sources.

Table 7: Capital City and gap to the PCI-maximizing location

Dependent variable: Gap Distance (1990)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	A. Democratic Countries		B. Autocratic Countries		C. Full Sample		
	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	OLS	OLS
Autocracy	0.137*** [0.048]	0.025** [0.010]			0.165*** [0.040]	0.038*** [0.012]	0.040*** [0.012]
Democracy			0.159* [0.094]	0.022** [0.0088]	0.143*** [0.038]	0.023*** [0.011]	0.032*** [0.012]
Log(Population)	0.044 [0.045]	0.0297** [0.013]	0.100** [0.045]	0.012 [0.024]	0.079*** [0.029]	0.032*** [0.012]	0.033* [0.019]
Log(GDP per Capita)	-0.092 [0.092]	0.041 [0.050]	-0.098 [0.076]	-0.039 [0.055]	-0.082 [0.056]	-0.002 [0.032]	0.001 [0.038]
Regional Fixed Effect		YES		YES		YES	YES
Legal Origin Fixed Effect		YES		YES		YES	YES
Other controls							YES
Observations	58	58	54	54	113	113	100
R-squared	.	0.26	.	0.25	.	0.22	0.26

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Intercept omitted. Robust standard errors in brackets. Panel A consists of countries with autocracy score less than 2, Panel B consists of countries with democracy score less than 2. Dependent variable is calculated as the distance between the actual and the hypothetical capital city that maximizes PCI. Other control variables include Log Land Area, Landlock, Island, Coastshare (coastal line as proportion of total boundary). Independent variables are taken with lag 5. Tobit regressions' standard errors are bootstrapped with 500-replications.

Table 8: Population Concentration in US States

State	Code	GCISC_1	Rank GCISC_1	GCISC_2	Rank GCISC_2	LCISC	Rank LCISC	Gini Pop	Rank Gini Pop
Illinois	IL	0.3029	6	0.0793	1	0.8916	8	0.3066	43
South Dakota	SD	0.3042	7	0.0943	2	0.8901	7	0.2945	36
Florida	FL	0.2309	2	0.0998	3	0.8068	2	0.3867	50
Nevada	NV	0.2801	4	0.1445	4	0.8182	4	0.3311	47
Missouri	MO	0.3447	10	0.1452	5	0.9215	15	0.2880	29
Alaska	AK	0.1465	1	0.1465	6	0.5801	1	0.2683	20
Delaware	DE	0.5101	43	0.1530	7	0.9759	46	0.2883	30
New York	NY	0.3171	8	0.1530	8	0.9007	9	0.3025	40
Alabama	AL	0.3625	12	0.1542	9	0.9230	16	0.3088	44
California	CA	0.2590	3	0.1617	10	0.8076	3	0.3089	45
South Carolina	SC	0.4137	28	0.1669	11	0.9463	34	0.3007	39
Pennsylvania	PA	0.3661	13	0.1706	12	0.9272	18	0.2713	21
Ohio	OH	0.3891	20	0.1769	13	0.9357	24	0.2739	22
North Dakota	ND	0.3725	16	0.1775	14	0.9087	12	0.2786	25
New Jersey	NJ	0.4723	38	0.1838	15	0.9699	44	0.2790	26
Iowa	IA	0.3999	25	0.1962	16	0.9323	21	0.2325	3
Mississippi	MS	0.3891	19	0.1962	17	0.9276	19	0.2518	9
Texas	TX	0.2941	5	0.1976	18	0.8688	5	0.3179	46
Arkansas	AR	0.4147	30	0.1990	19	0.9396	28	0.2553	13
Tennessee	TN	0.3721	15	0.2110	20	0.9136	13	0.2890	31
Indiana	IN	0.4285	32	0.2126	21	0.9448	33	0.3034	41
Vermont	VT	0.4762	39	0.2176	22	0.9684	43	0.2317	2
Montana	MT	0.3439	9	0.2180	23	0.9032	10	0.2931	34
Wyoming	WY	0.3510	11	0.2191	24	0.8708	6	0.2348	5
New Mexico	NM	0.3715	14	0.2248	25	0.9157	14	0.2947	37
Louisiana	LA	0.4032	27	0.2300	26	0.9368	26	0.2775	24
Wisconsin	WI	0.3893	21	0.2342	27	0.9343	22	0.2411	6
West Virginia	WV	0.4159	31	0.2356	28	0.9408	30	0.2332	4
North Carolina	NC	0.3811	17	0.2387	29	0.9286	20	0.2938	35
Kentucky	KY	0.3951	23	0.2392	30	0.9395	27	0.2525	11
Connecticut	CT	0.5334	46	0.2470	31	0.9778	48	0.2484	7
Washington	WA	0.4012	26	0.2496	32	0.9365	25	0.2527	12
Kansas	KS	0.3844	18	0.2584	33	0.9260	17	0.2575	14
Virginia	VA	0.3934	22	0.2610	34	0.9352	23	0.2964	38
Maine	ME	0.4437	35	0.2720	35	0.9577	38	0.2507	8
Michigan	MI	0.3957	24	0.2871	36	0.9432	31	0.2605	16
Idaho	ID	0.4138	29	0.2925	37	0.9048	11	0.2898	32
Oklahoma	OK	0.4382	34	0.2993	38	0.9445	32	0.2618	17
New Hampshire	NH	0.5134	44	0.3025	39	0.9773	47	0.2772	23

Georgia	GA	0.4537	37	0.3072	40	0.9469	36	0.3547	49
Oregon	OR	0.4327	33	0.3081	41	0.9467	35	0.2805	27
Maryland	MD	0.5010	41	0.3114	42	0.9749	45	0.2922	33
Nebraska	NE	0.4454	36	0.3377	43	0.9406	29	0.2041	1
Massachusetts	MA	0.5548	48	0.3526	44	0.9779	49	0.2596	15
Minnesota	MN	0.4978	40	0.3830	45	0.9569	37	0.2519	10
Arizona	AZ	0.5088	42	0.3830	46	0.9580	39	0.3477	48
Colorado	CO	0.5261	45	0.3997	47	0.9642	40	0.2863	28
Utah	UT	0.5411	47	0.4238	48	0.9674	42	0.2656	18
Rhode Island	RI	0.6907	50	0.4465	49	0.9926	50	0.2674	19
Hawaii	HI	0.5855	49	0.4606	50	0.9663	41	0.3049	42

Table 9: Population Concentration in US Metropolitan Statistical Areas

city_id	City	Rank		Rank		Rank		Rank	
		GCISC_1	GCISC_1	GCISC_2	GCISC_2	LCISC	LCISC	Gini Pop	Gini Pop
20	San Francisco	0.2169	1	0.1847	1	0.6626	1	0.3089	15
19	San Diego	0.2212	2	0.2212	2	0.6876	2	0.3089	16
10	Houston	0.2571	3	0.2485	3	0.7351	3	0.3179	19
8	Dallas	0.2607	4	0.2336	4	0.7422	4	0.3179	20
17	Pittsburgh	0.2724	5	0.1585	5	0.7792	7	0.2713	5
12	Miami	0.2764	6	0.2479	6	0.7637	6	0.3867	23
18	Riverside	0.2785	7	0.2665	7	0.7630	5	0.3089	17
5	Cincinnati	0.2795	8	0.1680	8	0.8103	9	0.2739	7
23	Tampa	0.2901	9	0.2112	9	0.8246	10	0.3867	24
11	Los Angeles	0.3282	10	0.3125	10	0.7909	8	0.3089	18
7	Cleveland	0.3319	11	0.2000	11	0.8587	13	0.2739	8
22	St. Louis	0.3368	12	0.2458	12	0.8332	11	0.2880	10
15	Philadelphia	0.3541	13	0.2635	13	0.8433	12	0.2713	6
6	Detroit	0.4016	14	0.3624	14	0.8944	15	0.2605	4
1	Atlanta	0.4075	15	0.3070	15	0.9035	16	0.3547	22
21	Seattle	0.4286	16	0.3338	16	0.9078	18	0.2527	2
4	Chicago	0.4420	17	0.3750	17	0.9057	17	0.3066	14
14	New York	0.4491	18	0.3732	18	0.8887	14	0.3025	12
16	Phoenix	0.4621	19	0.3789	19	0.9238	19	0.3477	21
13	Minneapolis	0.4664	20	0.3940	20	0.9240	20	0.2519	1
9	Denver	0.4857	21	0.3992	21	0.9347	21	0.2863	9
2	Baltimore	0.5130	22	0.3734	22	0.9610	23	0.2922	11
3	Boston	0.5144	23	0.3509	23	0.9589	22	0.2596	3
24	Washington DC	0.7397	24	0.3609	24	0.9937	24	0.3041	13